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# ***JPRS Report***

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## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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## CONTENTS

14 DECEMBER 1987

### NEAR EAST

#### EGYPT

Interview With Al-Azhar's Imam On Gulf War [Imam Jad al-Haqq 'Ali Jad al-Haqq Interview; AL-TADAMUN, 24-30 Oct 87]	1
President of Arab-French Banking Federation Discusses Economy [Ali Nijm Interview; AL-HAWADITH, 23 Oct 87]	4
Government Accused of Installing Widespread Bugging System [AL-SHA'B, 25 Aug 87]	7
New Information on Egypt's Revolution Group Disclosed [AL-DUSTUR, 26 Oct 87]	8
Columnist Comments on 'Democratic Sudan' [AKHIR SA'AH, 30 Sep 87]	11

#### ISRAEL

Changing Role Of IDF Spokesman Discussed [BAMAHANE, 30 Sep 87]	12
Begin Joins Fellowship To Save MIA's [Michael Kleiner Interview; BAMAHANE, 30 Sep 87]	13

#### JORDAN

Joint Talks With British Review Status Of West Bank [AL-DUSTUR, 3 Nov 87]	14
Interior Minister Discusses Arab Peace Strategy [Raja'i al-Dajjani Interview; AL-HAWADITH, 6 Nov 87]	14
National Fund Carries Out Vocational Training Programs [AL-DUSTUR, 2 Nov 87]	16
Al-Karak 3-Year Village Development Plan Reviewed [AL-DUSTUR, 4 Nov 87]	17

#### LEBANON

Fadlallah Speaks Out Against Kidnapping, Extortion [AL-NAHAR, 24 Oct 87]	19
Shi'ites Urged To Unite Under Supreme Council [AL-MUSTAQBAL, 24 Oct 87]	21
Analyst Views Interaction Between Economic, Political Factors [AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL, Sep 87]	21

#### SAUDI ARABIA

New Nationwide Electricity Hookup Reviewed [AL-RIYAD, 1 Nov 87]	22
Study Predicts Intensification Of Saudization Program [AL-YAMAMAH, 16 Sep 87]	23

#### SUDAN

Negotiations with Southern Parties Reported [AL-DUSTUR, 12 Oct 87]	25
New Railroad Grant From World Bank [AL-DUSTUR, 19 Oct 87]	26

#### YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

President Discusses Oil, Unity, International Relations [AL-MUSTAQBAL, 31 Oct 87]	26
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## EGYPT

### Interview With Al-Azhar's Imam On Gulf War

45040011 London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic  
24-30 Oct 87 pp 14-16

[Interview with Shaykh al-Azhar Imam Jad al-Haqq 'Ali Jad al-Haqq by Ihsan Bakr and 'Adil al-Jawjari: "Shaykh al-Azhar Imam Jad al-Haqq 'Ali Jad al-Haqq Uses AL-TADAMUN To Tell Khomeyni and Iran's Rulers, 'Stop the War in God's Name;' To Arab Leaders at the Amman Summit the Shaykh Says, 'Unify Your Ranks and Speak with One Voice for the Welfare of Your People; Remember: the Day Will Come "When Wealth and Children Will Avail Nothing and When None Shall Be Saved except Him Who Comes before His Lord with a Pure Heart" ' [al-Shu'ara': 88];" in Cairo; date not specified]

[Text] When we went to interview the great imam, the shaykh of al-Azhar Mosque for AL-TADAMUN, there were many things on our minds. Al-Shaykh Jad al-Haqq 'Ali Jad al-Haqq is not only an Egyptian public figure, but he is also a man who transcends all barriers and nationalities by virtue of his major religious position. Al-Shaykh Jad al-Haqq speaks as a leader of all Muslims wherever they may be. This interview then is not so much an interview with an Egyptian personality as much as it is an interview with one of the Islamic world's most important symbols.

Although an interview with the great imam has to touch upon Islamic and Muslims' affairs, the circumstances of the Arab and Islamic worlds are such that an interview with him has to touch upon politics too. The imam talks about the Gulf war, about Iran's responsibility, and about the Islamic world's responsibility from a comprehensive, Islamic perspective. He also talks about these matters from a political perspective that understands the facts and ramifications of major international interests and is aware of them. The imam talks about the UN resolution which Iran is stubbornly rejecting. He talks about the Islamic Conference Organization, and he is calling for UN troops to separate Iran from Iraq.

From his office, a few steps away from the mosque of Our Lord Imam al-Husayn, may God be pleased with him, the Shaykh of al-Azhar is sending an open letter to Khomeyni, asking him to spare Muslims' blood. Using the pages of AL-TADAMUN, Shaykh Jad al-Haqq 'Ali Jad al-Haqq is also sending a message to Arab kings, princes and heads of state who will be meeting in Amman, the capital of Jordan, on 8 November. He is asking them to assume their responsibilities and save conditions from further deterioration, and he is holding them responsible for stopping the deterioration. The Muslims' imam is sending a third letter to Iraq's President Saddam Husayn and a fourth one to the Palestinian leader, Yasir 'Arafat.

When we went to meet his eminence the great imam, we were thinking about the powerful statement he had issued when Iranian militias, not pilgrims, desecrated the holy sites of Islam, created disturbances, and started fighting in territory that was declared by God a sacred sanctuary. Iran's recent position, as Shaykh Jad al-Haqq has stated, exposed Tehran's rulers whose hostility, it is now clear, is directed against all Muslims and not just against Iraq. The rulers of Iran are engaged in the creation of civil strife whose targets are the Islamic nation's noblest sites.

When we asked his eminence the great imam if the war in the Gulf was an Islamic war or a war between Shi'ites and Sunnis, he rejected all these characterizations and said that the war reflected the political ambitions of the rulers in Tehran. Our interview with the great imam lasted for almost one hour. It was interrupted by a few telephone calls and by a few al-Azhar officials who insisted on shaking the great imam's hand before traveling abroad.

In no uncertain terms the great imam is a witty, incisive and clear-headed man whose thoughts and answers are organized and ready. Although his office staff had asked us to submit our questions to him in advance, we had not done so. We preferred our interview with the great imam to be direct, spontaneous, and effusive. This is the text of the interview:

[Question] Anyone who ponders what is happening on the Arab and Islamic scene feels somewhat frustrated. How do you, your eminence, view these conditions, now that the war in the gulf is in its eighth year?

[Answer] The Holy Koran invokes the principle of arbitration between Muslims when they have a disagreement. God Almighty said, "If two parties of believers take up arms the one against the other, make peace between them. If either of them commits aggression against the other, fight against the aggressors till they submit to Allah's judgment" [al-Hujurat: 9]. But such arbitration by Muslim scholars has not been successful throughout the war, and although an arbitration and peace committee has been formed, a decisive outcome has not been reached. I believe that this committee did not come up with any results because of the condition of the Arab and Islamic nation. It is obvious that the Arab and Islamic nation is in a state of disarray, division, and fragmentation. The Arabs themselves are divided into camps, and their objective is not the preservation of the faith. The Arabs are the heart of the Islamic nation. If they are healthy, the Islamic nation is all right; but if they are as divided as they are now, then that division is reflected on the body of the Islamic nation in its entirety. And that is what is happening now.

The superpowers' intervention in the Gulf war, not under the auspices of the United Nations, is a grave matter for the region and for Muslims. In fact, it is a

dangerous warning to the entire world. The recent Security Council resolution which called for an end to the war was quite significant for all countries of the world, particularly the Islamic countries. But international politics is always concerned with private rather than public interests. So as long as the Security Council does not take matters in its own hands and issue a unanimous resolution, its resolution will be like others, mere ink on paper. The superpowers who are members of the Security Council should decide, once again unanimously, not only that no arms would be sold to the fighting countries, but also that a UN disengagement force would be sent to the region. That is the decision which should have been made regardless of the fighters' nationality, religion, or social denomination. This is my appeal to UN and Security Council officials: Send a Security Council military force to separate Iraq and Iran from each other and to act as an arbiter and effect a reconciliation between the two. Send a force that can put an end to the war and establish peace.

[Question] What do you think is the responsibility of the Islamic world regarding putting an end to this war? And what is the responsibility of the Holy al-Azhar as the leading institution in the Islamic world?

[Answer] President Muhammad Husni Mubarak called for an emergency summit meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization the day after the disturbances and the attack on Mecca. Had members of that organization responded to his invitation to hold a meeting, they would have had an opportunity to talk about all these problems. The incidents in Mecca were nothing more than an extension of the war between Iran and Iraq. But every piece of advice given and every call to action that is made are wasted because of the fragmentation, divisiveness, and submissiveness which are prevalent in the countries of the Arab world, not among the people. What happened in Mecca, as those incidents were then described, was grave, but those Mecca incidents are an extension of what is happening in the Gulf. Al-Azhar did give and has always been giving advice. Unfortunately, it seems that Islamic countries do not have the power to separate and keep the two fighting countries apart. Nor does al-Azhar have that power. That is why we called for UN intervention and specifically for Security Council intervention. We want the Security Council to use force to separate the fighters. Those resolutions, which are mere ink on paper, make no real contribution to the effort to put an end to this destructive war.

[Question] There are those who see this war as a sectarian war and those who see it as a political or racial war. What does your eminence think about that?

[Answer] I do not believe it is a religious war. Nor do I believe it is a sectarian or racial war. Shi'ites and Sunnis are organic members of the Islamic community. They are two denominations that have coexisted in the Islamic community for over 1,000 years without any conflict. They did not even have any problems to speak of. Islam

did away with prejudice about one's lineage. Everyone is considered a Muslim, and all Muslims are one nation united together by a sense of brotherhood and piety. This war is a political war. There is a group of people that wants to have the upper hand where it is located. Those people want to control their neighbors, but not because the ones over here are Shi'ites while the others over there are Sunnis. There are Shi'ites in Iraq and Syria, and there are Shi'ites and Sunnis in the Gulf countries also. In my view this war is neither religious nor sectarian; it is rather a political war sought by the regime that is prolonging the war, refusing advice, and declining to stop the fighting. International organizations and Muslim scholars from all the Islamic countries have been calling for an end to this war. In fact, this is what God ordered in the Holy Koran which all Muslims must obey. Iraq has declared that it would accept arbitration and what the scholars would say, but Iran has turned down international resolutions and rejected Islamic reconciliation.

[Question] Your Eminence, is there something you would like to say to Khomeyni in that regard?

[Answer] I would tell Imam Khomeyni and all Iranian as well as Iraqi officials: Do God's bidding. God says that all believers are brothers. I would tell them defer to the judgment of Muslim scholars. Sit together; present the evidence, the documents, and the proof. Accept the judgment of Muslim scholars. Only then will God champion truth and foil falsehood.

[Question] The statement that your eminence made about the incidents in Mecca and Iranian conduct there had a considerable effect on Muslims. That was when Iranians turned the pilgrimage season into a boisterous and bloody demonstration. Do you, your eminence, have any further comment on these incidents?

[Answer] After the statement which was issued at the time by al-Azhar, I do not believe that any further comment on the matter would be called for. God protected the holy place in Mecca from transgression and fighting and from everything that would dishonor such a holy and hallowed place. It is a place honored by God and chosen as a sanctuary for people. It is no place for aggression, disputes or fights. Undoubtedly, what happened was a grave mistake made by those who instigated those incidents. Muslims should have expressed their opposition to those disturbances which took place so they would not recur. We hope that neither Iranians nor anyone else will repeat such actions. We hope that as days go by the holy square in Mecca will continue to be sacred, honored, and revered until we all meet our Maker.

[Question] An Arab summit meeting will be held in Jordan next November 8. What would your eminence tell the Arab leaders who would be meeting on that day?

[Answer] I would tell leaders of the Arab countries who, God willing, will be meeting in Jordan, to unify their ranks. I would tell them, "Speak with one voice in the interests of your people and in the interests of Islam." I would tell them, "You are like leaders to Muslims. Make an assessment about the dangers that surround you; clear the air in your midst; and spurn disputes because the nation's public interest takes precedence over private interests. History will judge you, and its verdict will be favorable or unfavorable. Furthermore, all of us will one day have to account to God for our actions, and on that day there will be no excuses."

[Question] In your opinion, your eminence, what are the most important dangers facing Arabs and Muslims? What are those dangers in the order of their importance?

[Answer] The Arab nation in particular and the Islamic nation in general are surrounded by many dangers. There is this war which has been going on in the Gulf for 8 years: thousands of young Muslims lost their lives in this war, and property worth millions has also been lost. Had this property and those lives been used to serve the cause of development for Arab and Islamic peoples, we would have been something else today. And what about usurped Palestine and captive Jerusalem? If only this war in the Gulf were a liberation war, the holy city of Jerusalem would have been liberated. And Afghanistan has been fighting a superpower for years. What have Muslims done for Afghanistan? And what about those wars in Chad, Morocco and elsewhere? Aren't all these things dangerous for Muslims? And let's not forget that vicious intellectual attack against the minds of Arabs and Muslims in Africa and Asia: an attack that has remained unopposed and unchallenged. Why? Because Muslim rulers are preoccupied with personal disputes. They are not considering the interests of the nation as a whole so they can protect it from forces threatening its downfall and collapse. Today, the world does not look upon the Arabs as one nation even though they do have what it takes to become one nation. If the Arabs were to adhere to their religion, they would rise to the ranks of a superpower. In this age, however, Muslims and Arabs have lost the main ingredients for unity. The rug is being pulled from under their feet, but no one is taking any action because everyone is thinking only of himself. And yet the day may come when those people will not be able to find themselves. As long as territory is being cut off from one country after the other one inch at a time, and as long as we remain subordinate to the superpowers, the countries of all Muslims remain in danger.

[Question] There are people who make a connection between the Islamic awakening and the terrorism which masquerades in religious garb. Most recently, we've seen a group which calls itself "Al-Najun min al-Nar" [Those Who Escaped the Fire]. What do you, your eminence, have to say about the phenomenon of terrorism in the name of religion?

[Answer] First of all, terrorism is not restricted to Egypt or to the Arabs; it is prevalent all over the world, and that is normal. In fact, the existence of virtue and evil is one of the laws of life that makes the triumph of virtue possible. But I believe that the incidents which were highlighted in Egypt were ones that were carried out by individuals even though those incidents were described as Islamic. But those incidents were not Islamic acts at all because Islam does not advocate violence. In fact, it rejects it. God says, "Call men to the path of your Lord with wisdom and kindly exhortation" [al-Nahl: 125]. This confirms Islam's opposition to violence and proves that peace is its reason for being. Anyone who uses violence in the name of Islam is not a Muslim and has nothing to do with Islam. Let me say here that people who are involved in such acts should not be described as Muslim extremists. Instead, they should be called by their names, just as gangs that appear in any country are called by theirs.

[Question] It has been noticed that every time Mr Yasir 'Arafat comes to Cairo, he makes a point of meeting with your eminence. What do you say to Palestinians during these critical times for the Palestinian cause?

[Answer] Every time we meet with Mr 'Arafat we affirm our concern as Egyptians and Arabs for the cause of the Palestinian people and their right to establish their state. That is why Egypt has been supporting the Palestinian cause and will continue to support it. Egypt fought four times for the Palestinian cause, and it defended the cause in international forums. Egypt has always supported the Palestinians and has always tried to bring about their return to their country. Egypt has been trying to regain Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque, two places that are very dear to the heart of every Arab and Muslim.

[Question] But what specifically do you say to Mr 'Arafat?

[Answer] I tell Mr 'Arafat and all Palestinian leaders, "Speak with one voice and unify your ranks. The wheels of your cause have been set in motion, but disputes and divisions are delaying a solution to the question and interfering with it." Under these conditions in which the Arab homeland is being exposed to division and fragmentation, Egypt's role remains unambiguous with regard to convening an international peace conference in the Middle East so that a favorable solution to the Palestinian question can be achieved.

[Question] Your Eminence, what can you say to President Saddam Husayn, president of Iraq, especially in the aftermath of Iraq's positive position vis a vis the Security Council Resolution?

[Answer] I would tell President Saddam Husayn that self control in adversity is a must. Iraq's position after its announcement that it would accept the Security Council resolution, provided it is implemented in its entirety, is one that we all respect. We support that position, and we

call upon the other party to comply with that and yield to God's judgment. We call upon the other party to consider what wise Muslims have said on the subject the final word in this matter.

[Question] It is obvious that everything in Lebanon has been destroyed by the sectarian conflict. Your Eminence, do you have an opinion on how that conflict can be resolved?

[Answer] Sectarianism in Lebanon was awakened by politics. Ever since independence, the people of Lebanon have lived together under an acceptable pact as one nation. If someone wanted to change that system, such a change would have been attempted through legal channels. There are foreigners, however, whose mission is to bring about the demise of Lebanon because Lebanon had opened its doors to Palestinians and was allowing them to use it to get to their territory. That is why the enemy tried to keep Palestinians out of Lebanon, and Arabs helped the enemy accomplish that. But Lebanon has always had sects which coexisted with each other in friendship and peace until political motives and dubious goals entered into the picture. Thus, the foreigners who were behind those motives and goals created the conflict between the sects. This is because there are no morals in politics.

[Question] Your Eminence, you played a role in stifling the winds of sectarianism which were blowing in Egypt. However, sectarian problems do emerge occasionally threatening national unity. What do you think about this matter?

[Answer] Let me say unequivocally that there is no sectarian strife in Egypt. A few incidents perpetrated by individuals should not be portrayed as sectarian strife. One Copt may disagree with another, or one Copt may disagree with a Muslim. Religion is not the reason why such people would disagree; but ongoing daily business is. If a Copt were to fight with a Muslim over matters that had to do with life, what does religion have to do with that? Although people with suspect motives may be portraying the matter as though it were sectarian strife, I am saying there is no sectarianism in Egypt. The Egyptian people have lived throughout history as a united nation because Islam respects Christianity and Judaism. It does not advocate coercion in anything at all because the principle in the Koran states that "There is no coercion in religion." That is why describing incidents committed by individuals as manifestations of sectarian strife is something I reject. These are matters that have to do with life and with the affairs of the world; they have nothing to do with religion.

[Question] Because of the time this is our last question. It has to do with the role of the holy al-Azhar in spreading the message of Islam all over the world.

[Answer] We thank God that through its scholars al-Azhar is playing a role all over the world. Muslim children are coming to al-Azhar to study: some have scholarships, and some are coming at their own expense. Al-Azhar is sparing no efforts to provide Islamic countries with Muslim scholars and Islamic publications. It is always contacting Islamic countries through visits made to those countries by senior scholars who teach the principles of religion. Two years ago we also organized training courses (four courses a year). These consist of lectures to those who spread the message of Islam everywhere. This year we will organize the seventh course for Muslim scholars.

08592

**President of Arab-French Banking Federation  
Discusses Economy**

*45050012b London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic  
23 Oct 87 pp 46-47*

[Interview with 'Ali Nijm, president of the Arab-French Banking Federation, by Amir al-Zahar: "The Former President of Egypt's Central Bank Tells AL-HAWADITH: 'Bureaucracy Is the Egyptian Economy's Primary Enemy';" in Cairo; date not specified]

[Text] 'Ali Nijm, former president of Egypt's Central Bank and current president of UBAF [the Federation of Arab and French Banks], told AL-HAWADITH that bureaucracy and government red tape were the primary enemies of economic development in Egypt. He said that Egypt's private sector could have made a greater contribution to new investments had the necessary earnestness been applied to take advantage of the economic climate which has been available since the onset of the liberalization policy.

The former president of Egypt's Central Bank answered many of the questions which AL-HAWADITH asked him about the problems of the Egyptian economy and solutions to them. He also answered questions about the future of development and about cooperation among the Arab countries in the economic and banking fields.

[Question] Economic development in Egypt is beset by numerous problems. In your opinion, what are these problems and what are the reasons for them?

[Answer] In a nutshell, the economic problem and the reasons for it are attributable to a set of factors which caused development to falter and fall short of achieving that level which would have been commensurate with the requirements of a rapidly growing population. These problems are manifested in the following:

1. Oil returns have declined as a result of a sharp drop in world oil prices.

2. Remittances from Egyptians working abroad declined as a result of a weak currency exchange system in Egypt's money market.

3. Returns from tourism declined as a result of growing tensions about security and politics in the Arab region in general.

4. The increase in Suez Canal transit fees has been less than what is required; this is a result of shrinking international trade activity.

5. In the past 3 years—1985, 1986, and 1987—the cost of servicing Egypt's foreign debt grew; it is now approximately 10 billion dollars.

The application of comprehensive, economic reform to achieve a substantial increase in foreign currency receipts and reduce foreign currency expenditures is an essential measure which must be taken to correct these difficulties and problems. This reform must achieve two principal objectives: correct the deficit in the general budget and that in the balance of payments.

[Question] And how can we go about correcting the deficit and achieving comprehensive economic reform?

[Answer] The general budget deficit can be corrected by increasing revenues, and that can be accomplished either by increasing fees and taxes or by raising the prices of principal goods and services.

The deficit in the balance of payments can be corrected by reducing our dependence on foreign countries and by developing our own ability to produce goods locally as an alternative to importing goods from abroad. In addition, we should increase our ability to export goods.

Given circumstances such as those which Egypt has been experiencing—and these circumstances are similar to those of developing countries in general—turning to international and regional financing institutions which can provide the necessary funding during the harsh period of early treatment is the method by means of which such a solution can be achieved. At the same time an effort must be made to reduce the foreign debt burden. Large debts are to be re-scheduled so that payments are made over longer periods of time and the interest rate on those debts is reduced. But it is known that an agreement with these different parties cannot be achieved until an agreement is reached with the IMF. The Egyptian government did in fact take that step, and last May, after that step was taken, Egypt's debts were re-scheduled through the Paris Club. The first positive outcome of this reform was the establishment of a free currency market in Egypt. That brought about significant reform in the exchange rate system and increased monetary remittances substantially.

[Question] Speaking of remittances, has the new currency exchange market achieved the ideal solution for the Egyptian market's exchange rate problems?

[Answer] There were long periods of time during which the exchange rate was determined by official decisions which were purely administrative and only rarely took the market method into account. Afterwards, a bonus system was adopted to attract more remittances from abroad. But as time went by, however, these bonuses became inappropriate. Then in mid May 1987 the new free currency exchange market became operational, and to a large extent business was conducted in accordance with prevalent market rates. Nevertheless, the new market is not regarded as a total solution to the exchange rate problem. Other steps ought to be taken so we can achieve one realistic rate of exchange. These steps include measures which would reduce the pressure on the balance of payments and increase currency revenues. At the same time, foreign spending should be reduced.

[Question] In your capacity as former president of Egypt's Central Bank, did Egypt's banking system play the part it should have played in the country's economic development and in mobilizing savings in Egypt?

[Answer] Egypt's banking system has grown considerably. In fact, given the deflation which started in late 1985, Egypt's banking system may have grown more than it should have. No more banks should be added to the 100 plus banks that are already in existence, but existing banks may open more branches to receive more deposits in savings from the various parts of Egypt.

The banking sector plays a concrete role in development, but we hope that it will be playing an even bigger role so that instead of hoarding cash or spending money on useless consumer items, banks will either make a greater contribution to investments and new projects or they will mobilize more of the savings and cash that is held by individuals. Deposits totaling 26 billion Egyptian pounds (in local and foreign currencies) are not enough, considering that Egypt's population exceeds 50 million persons and figures on Egyptians' estimated savings are huge. However, we ought to state here that the banking sector can do more if the economic and investment climate were to improve.

[Question] The private sector's domestic debts to the banking system are an obstacle to more private investments. What is the reason for this problem, and what is the remedy for it?

[Answer] There are two reasons for this problem. The first one has to do with the depression which started late in 1985 and was accompanied by a slowdown in economic activity, and the second has to do with the sharp rise in foreign currency prices compared with the price of the Egyptian pound. In my opinion, the solution to this

problem lies in re-scheduling those debts so that payments are made over longer periods of time. The re-scheduled debt should also be settled through the free currency exchange market so that debt payments do not create a new demand for foreign currency in the unofficial market, thereby leading to unanticipated increases in the prices of these currencies.

[Question] Some people are complaining about restrictions on the volume of credit for banks. They are also complaining about a decline in interest rates which caused a general decline in savings, economic activity and investments. What was the Central Bank's role in the creation of those restrictions?

[Answer] The volume of credit was determined years ago in accordance with the requirements of the local market and economic development. It was set at 65 percent of the amount of deposits in each bank. Later, the growth rate for the volume of credit was restricted to 2.5 percent, and that was done primarily to fight inflation. But that restriction undermined the banks' ability to lend money for projects. Nevertheless, there has to be some balance to keep inflation rates and prices from rising.

Given the demand for raising the interest rate which is paid on savings accounts in local currency and making that rate higher than the rate of inflation, the problem of interest rates earned on deposits becomes a double-edged sword. Although prices for some goods and services were raised by administrative decrees—and that implies fueling inflation—raising the interest rate and making it higher than the inflation rate will, in turn, lead to a substantial and continuing rise in the interest rate, and that will lead to another round of inflation which will exacerbate existing financial problems for the banking system and for clients, especially in light of the current depressed economic activity. It is therefore better not to raise interest rates which are paid on savings accounts until after prices remain stable for an appropriate period of time. Otherwise, we will find ourselves caught in a vicious cycle of alarming price increases.

[Question] In addition to serving as vice president of the International Arab Bank in Cairo, you were recently elected president of UBAF. What is UBAF, and what are its activities in the Arab region?

[Answer] UBAF is a bank representing a federation of Arab and French banks. It was founded in 1970 and consists of 26 participating institutions that include Arab governments and banks as well as three French banks. In addition, UBAF is a partner in national banks located in many parts of the world. These include four banks in the United States; four banks in Italy; one bank in each of the following countries: Britain, Germany, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Bahrain; and two banks in Japan. UBAF is engaged in all the ordinary banking business that takes place between the various Arab countries and the other countries of the world where its

branches are located. And that includes financing foreign trade, accepting deposits, disbursing funds, investing in stocks and bonds, and engaging in other activities.

At the present time we are trying to shore up the aspect of investing in stocks and bonds, and we are trying to create new areas of business in the Arab and African regions where UBAF has no branches.

[Question] Do Arab countries have a banking system that is large enough to handle these countries' huge financial surpluses and transactions?

[Answer] Although banks are relatively new in many Arab countries, the banking system has been growing rapidly. It may be said that the activities of all banks in the Arab world are growing and that these activities are starting to spread worldwide.

[Question] Speaking of Arab monetary surpluses, have these surpluses been properly used to serve the countries of the Arab region? To what extent do Arab banks work with each other?

[Answer] Arab surplus funds have not been utilized in the manner that every Arab has been hoping for. This may be due to the fact that these matters are affected by political considerations and attitudes. Major steps, such as the decision to establish the Arab Common Market, have already been taken by the Arab League. Another step was the decision to adopt the Arab dinar as the standard currency. But because of political obstacles, these measures were not implemented. Investments within the Arab region should, of course, be increased, especially since all the factors of investment and production are available in abundance in the various countries: Sudan has vast areas of land which can solve food problems; Egypt has manpower and technicians; and widespread areas for tourism can be found in many countries. Other factors abound, and those need nothing more than a cooperative effort which serves the interests of the entire area. Regarding relations between Arab banks, it may be said that Arab banks have an unwritten agreement not to allow political factors to interfere with their relations. That is why cooperation among banks in Arab countries is excellent.

[Question] Let's go back one more time to the Egyptian economy. What is the most important ingredient needed by that economy to put it on its way to comprehensive development?

[Answer] The Egyptian economy has many of the ingredients that would help it move ahead and grow quickly. However, the alarming government bureaucracy is the most important problem for development in Egypt. The approvals and measures which are required for every project are still lengthy and riddled with obstacles. The success of an investment requires the practical elimination of this horrifying monster, and that can't be done by amending provisions or changing what we say. The



elimination of bureaucracy rather requires using new methods to set the wheels of government in motion. The other thing that Egypt's economy needs is more encouragement for the private sector which, I think, lacks the required earnestness in its operations. Furthermore, the state should utilize the public sector to concentrate on infrastructure projects so these can be strengthened and used to serve development. Foremost among these projects are those which are being carried out in the fields of electricity, energy, roads, water, and communications. This is definitely 100 times better for the country than becoming involved in selling sandwiches or in the motion picture industry.

08592

**Government Accused of Installing Widespread Bugging System**

45040002 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 25 Aug 87 p 3

[Article by Hamdi al-Shami]

[Text] Specialized technical agencies have completed the installation of the largest electronic system for spying on the Egyptian people through audio-visual recording of telephone conversations at special operations rooms away from the switchboards of the National Authority for Wire and Wireless Communications, whereby telephone users cannot detect weak or bad connections or interference associated with traditional bugging at listening posts set up at the offices of the communications authority.

These agencies that employ hundreds of technicians have installed ground telephone bugging cables in the streets and public squares of Egyptian cities and towns, connecting them to communications authority telephone cables so that electronic listening posts can, through their special networks, tap into the lines of telephone subscribers to record personal calls and photos and the time and date of the calls.

The installation of the ground system was preceded by setting up secret listening posts equipped with American-made bugging devices under the watchful eyes of a presidential security official. Cities have been divided into grids, based on size and number of phone lines in use, and each group includes a listening post managed by Egyptian technicians trained in America.

These electronic listening posts can spy on hundreds of lines at once, merely by pressing a button to begin recording on special tapes and to photograph on other tapes, depending on the nature of the political decision taken in this regard, thus recording the movements of telephone users, Egyptian opposition elements and national forces in particular, for minute-by-minute monitoring of their intentions, social and political agreements, and movements, 24 hours a day.

These listening posts in some ways resemble electronic monitoring devices used by advanced intelligence agencies and by some Arab news agencies that use certain models of such devices to record international radio news broadcasts electronically by supplying them with the required data and figures. These devices can be activated to do their job without human intervention.

All that these devices need is the telephone number to begin their work of automatically recording the caller's voice or photograph, depending on the nature of the decision. With the completion of this dangerous system—programmed and operated under the supervision of students of tyrants Salah Nasr, Hamzah Basyuni, and Hasan 'Ulaysh, who have returned to their old positions within the presidential, army intelligence, and political establishments—the Egyptian people have fallen easy prey to an electronic trap that calculates their every breath and counts their every step by means of diabolical devices made in America, who has refused to lower the usurious rates of interest it charges for our military debts and refuses to supply us with our modern and sophisticated needs without torture, conditions, and manipulation. This is while, when it comes to espionage and pursuit of the Egyptian people, America promptly exports to the ruling regime the most modern and advanced electronic espionage and bugging devices. Witness its fortification of the palaces and resthouses of senior executives and military leaders with early warning and photographic equipment for their protection.

With the completion of the telephone bugging system to be used against the Egyptian people, the ruling regime has acquired a set of dreadful espionage and bugging devices under the supervision of the presidency, which it uses to watch, spy on, photograph, and monitor all the movements of national elements and party leaders. These devices are:

1. The special electronic security plan, which calls for drawing up a security chart for on-the-spot monitoring of the Egyptian people's movements after political decisions in this regard have been made.
2. Electronically-equipped briefcases placed in locked cars parked in the vicinity of the building where the target's telephone is located. These produce audio-visual recordings every time the target telephone's receiver is lifted. Because of their high cost, they are only used against national leaders and personalities.
3. Laser eavesdropping devices that violate the people's inviolable rights in their homes, places of work, and at their meetings, by recording their activities on video cassettes.
4. Mobile listening posts set up in cars carrying miniature laser bugging devices that allow the driver to engage in audio-visual espionage against targets, their homes, offices, and even their movements in the street, without any detection whatsoever.

5. Traditional listening posts located in every telephone office in Egypt to bug the telephones of targeted individuals. These posts are run by specially trained police officers.

6. Field surveillance by means of informants, carried out by officers, NCO's, or privates operating on foot, motorcycles, in private cars, or in taxis. This is the kind of serious surveillance that allows for first-hand monitoring of the movements of national elements by means of miniature recording devices carried by the informant in the form of shirt buttons, a ring, a watch, or miniature cameras the size of a matchbox. Usually these people rotate between cities in regular intervals to avoid detection. They are all linked to their work by an ultra-shortwave radio.

By adding the device under discussion to these means, the regime now has seven ways to eavesdrop and spy on the Egyptian people, the most sophisticated of which were discussed in earlier articles.

Thus, the ruling regime is holding the Egyptian people in a huge electronic prison whose boundaries are those of the Arab Republic of Egypt, whose inmates are 50 million citizens, and whose techniques include seven diabolical methods for torturing the Egyptian people through surveillance, espionage, and eavesdropping, methods that are in contravention of God's law, which forbids espionage and eavesdropping and safeguards the people's inviolable rights.

This dreadful electronic trap underscores the fact that we live under a military and police regime, a regime which plans to survive and maintain the status quo by enslaving an entire people and allowing us only limited freedom of vocal expression, which is to the advantage of the regime alone because it lets the people air their feelings without the regime's being required to react to it. This is because the ruling regime ignores public opinion and issues decisions that are contrary to popular sentiment. This is the trait of autocratic regimes.

12502

#### **New Information on Egypt's Revolution Group Disclosed**

45040015 *London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic*  
26 Oct 87 pp 12-14

[Article by Jamal Isma'il: "What Wasn't Published About the Egypt's Revolution Organization"]

[Text] Has the Egypt's Revolution organization, which carried out the armed operations against Israelis and Americans in Cairo, been finished off? Or are the persons the Egyptian authorities arrested only one of many groups which are still operating underground? This two-part question came to mind when AL-DUSTUR

obtained new information on this organization, the circumstances surrounding its exposure, and the arrest of some of its members in Cairo, which it is here publishing for the first time.

A few days ago, Cairo awoke to an Interior Ministry statement announcing that security forces had succeeded in arresting the perpetrators of the shooting incidents against the American diplomats on al-Ma'adi Road last May, the 1986 shootings at Israeli embassy employees at the Cairo international fair, and the 1985 assassination of the Israeli administrative attache in Cairo.

The Interior Ministry statement said that the arrests were part of a plan drawn up by the General Department for State Security Investigations "to dispel the obscurity surrounding these incidents." This department had succeeded in determining who had been involved in the incidents, and had sought permission from the Supreme Deputy for State Security "to follow their recent movements and draw up a plan to arrest them." Security forces raided the Misr al-Jadidah residence of the group's leader, who fired on the officers and enlisted men with a machine gun. The security forces stormed the residence and arrested him. According to the statement, "a large number of automatic rifles, pistols and explosives used by the criminals in those incidents were seized, along with a typewriter which had probably been used to type the leaflets which the group had issued in the name of 'Egypt's Revolution,' announcing that they had committed those incidents." The statement explained that the Supreme Deputy for State Security is now interrogating the criminals.

#### **A Publication Ban**

This statement, which the Cairo paper AL-AHRAM published on 18 September, referred in passing to the incidents which it said the criminals had committed against the Americans and Israelis in Cairo, but it did not give any other details about the case, because an order had been issued banning the publication of such details. This order only heightened the mystery surrounding the case and opened the door to conjectures, rumors and attempts at defamation. Even so, information began leaking out, and AL-DUSTUR obtained enough to sketch the background of what happened in Cairo on the morning of 17 September.

In attempting to fill in the background of what happened, using the limited information making the rounds, we must begin by trying to answer an important question: What is the Egypt's Revolution organization?

AL-DUSTUR's archives indicate that the Egypt's Revolution organization, or group, declared itself for the first time in June 1984, following an attempt to assassinate an Israeli diplomat in Cairo called Zavi Kadir. The assailants had waited in an unidentified car for him to return to his home in al-Ma'adi and had shot at him, but they missed and only grazed him in the hand. At the time, it

was said that the target of this operation was Ezra Feitzman, chief of the Israeli delegation to the supreme joint committee for "normalization" of relations with Egypt, who was visiting Cairo at the time; Zavi Kadir had been assigned to accompany him.

The consecutive armed operations against Israelis in Cairo date from this incident.

At 0830 on 20 August 1985, an Israeli intelligence officer, Albert Atrakshi, who was operating under cover as "administrative attache" at the Israeli embassy and who also lived in al-Ma'adi, was on his way to work at the embassy in Gizah. An unidentified car came along as he, his wife Elena Atrakshi, and his secretary Mazal Mansha were getting into his car. In this operation, Atrakshi was assassinated and his wife and his secretary wounded. During the investigation, the secretary said that she had seen a dark grey car driven by a tall, swarthy young man about 40 years old who was observing their Volkswagen. The Egypt's Revolution organization claimed responsibility for the incident.

After the Atrakshi incident and the Zavi operation, there was an attempt to blow up the Israeli consulate in Alexandria, which was unsuccessful because the authorities discovered the explosives, which had been placed on top of the consulate's elevator.

In February 1985, someone in a speeding car threw a bomb at the Israeli embassy in Cairo, but his aim was not precise and the bomb landed in a vacant flat in a building next to the embassy. Egypt's Revolution did not claim responsibility for either of these operations.

The third incident for which Egypt's Revolution claimed responsibility took place in March 1986. This was the operation which took place at 1900 on Wednesday 19 March at the rear door of the Cairo international fair at the Nasr City fairgrounds east of Cairo.

This operation took place 25 minutes after Avraham Sharir, the enemy's minister of tourism and ambassador to Cairo, left to see the Israeli wing at the Cairo international fair. It resulted in the death of Ayni Tal Awd, who had been working at the Israeli embassy as secretary for both the cultural attache and the first secretary, and the wounding of three of her colleagues—two male security guards and one female guard. According to one of the persons injured in this operation, an Israeli embassy chauffeur and guard named David Salvador Sera, a car which might have been a Peugeot 305 blocked their way as they were leaving at the end of their shift at the Israeli wing, and a man carrying a machine gun got out and fired a series of shots. Thus ended the operation.

Following the three operations—the Zavi, the Atrakshi and the Cairo fair operations—some news agencies in Egypt received statements from the Egypt's Revolution organization announcing its responsibility. After the

Cairo fair operation, the organization said in its statement, "Our armed Egyptian Nasserist vanguards sent the corpses of some members of Israeli intelligence who were supervising the Israeli wing at the Cairo international fair to Hell." The statement made it clear that the operation was in response to "the allocation of a wing at the Cairo fair to Israel."

Furthermore, in all three operations, investigations turned up nothing, and all threads were lost in the search for the assailants, who had obviously planned their operations very carefully. One indication of this precise planning is the fact that Mary Rabat, assistant commercial attache at the Israeli embassy, said in her statement on the Cairo fair operation, "For security reasons, every day we change the cars used by employees at the wing."

### Escalation of the Operations

Following the Cairo international fair operation, there was a period of silence, which Egypt's Revolution shattered with a new operation, not against the Israelis but against the Americans.

On the morning of 26 May 1986, in the middle of the Nile Corniche, a private car without license plates blocked the way of another car belonging to the American embassy in Cairo. This car was occupied by Dennis William, described as security director for the embassy, his assistant, John Hawk, and an administrative employee at the embassy. The American car was on its way from al-Ma'adi to the American embassy in Garden City. The unidentified car blocked its way and forced it to the side of the road, and then someone in the car fired on the American car with an automatic rifle. The assailants were able to flee after the incident, which resulted in minor injuries to the American security official and his assistant. A few hours after the incident, an unknown person, speaking fluent English, contacted one of the news agencies to announce Egypt's Revolution's responsibility for the incident. Two days after the incident, it was reported that the Egyptian authorities had found an automobile believed to have been used in the incident.

This was the first operation against the Americans, after the three operations against the Israelis, and it seems that it won't be the last. In this connection, it is said that Egypt's Revolution had planned a second operation against Americans living in Cairo, to have been carried out in the period just prior to the arrest of the alleged "group leader" and those who were with him.

The information which AL-DUSTUR has obtained regarding this operation, which had not been announced previously, indicates that Egypt's Revolution had been observing the movements of several American officers living in Cairo, in the Golf Course area of Misr al-Jadidah to be exact, and had decided to launch an operation against them while they were on their way to a party. However, this operation was never completed, for unknown reasons. In a brief statement, the Egyptian

Interior Ministry mentioned that there had been an exchange of gunfire in the Golf Course area of Misr al-Jadidah, but made no reference to the nature of what had happened.

### AL-DUSTUR's Information

The order banning the publication of information about the Egypt's Revolution case in Cairo did not prevent a very limited leakage of information within Egyptian political party circles.

Some of this information indicated that the minutes of the investigation showed that Egypt's Revolution had issued a statement announcing a 6-month suspension of its activities for two reasons. According to the statement, the first reason was that some terrorist organizations were trying to copy its methods but were directing their activities against Egyptians, "while Egypt's Revolution limits its activities to Zionists and Americans." The second reason, also mentioned in the statement, was that Egypt's Revolution had joined, or was about to join, another organization called "the Egyptian Nationalist Organization." This was the first mention of such an organization, the goals of which, according to the statement, are the same as those of Egypt's Revolution.

Our information also indicates that about 10 days after the arrest of the Egypt's Revolution group, AL-AHALI, which is the organ for the Egyptian opposition Tajammu' Party, reported that it had received a telephone call from an unknown person who said he was speaking on behalf of Egypt's Revolution. Referring to the above-mentioned statement, he said that there was no connection between the suspension of this group's activities and the arrest announced by the Interior Ministry. AL-AHALI said that it informed the officials of this conversation and printed news of it on its front page, but the authorities confiscated the issue after it was distributed to the stores, feeling that the publication of such news constituted a violation of the ban on publishing.

It is also reported that the leaked information on the investigation being conducted by the Supreme Deputy For State Security included names of some well-known persons, and that the investigation uncovered plans for operations which had been prepared against the Zionist and American presence in Egypt. In this connection, it is said that between 12 and 16 persons were arrested, including the alleged leader of the group, his wife, his brother, and some civilians, in addition to several active and retired army officers.

As for how this group was arrested, some people see a connection between the information about the organization which was leaked and which led to its exposure and a disagreement which took place between the group leader and his brother, 'Isam al-Sayyid. In this context, it is said that this disagreement ended with the 'Isam

incident, and that the matter eventually led to 'Isam's being arrested after having spent 50 days being interrogated inside the American embassy in Cairo.

### The Group Leader

An important question remains: who is the group leader, whose den in Misr al-Jadidah was raided in the early hours of Thursday, 17 September, according to the Interior Ministry's statement, and who was arrested after resisting with a machine gun and wounding a security force enlisted man?

Once again, the limited information circulating in Cairo says that the name of this leader is Nur al-Sayyid.

Nur al-Sayyid is an Egyptian known to Arab journalistic circles in London, since he, his wife and his three daughters lived in London during the late Seventies, in February 1979 to be exact, when he helped publish the Egyptian magazine 23 JULY, a publication which opposed al-Sadat following his famous trip to occupied Jerusalem and his signing of the Camp David agreements.

Prior to publishing 23 JULY, Nur al-Sayyid was a local employee of the Egyptian embassy in London. Some people say he held an humble position, while others say that his lengthy residence in London and his command of the English language, which he speaks fluently, in addition to his personal and physical characteristics, qualified him to accompany important official Egyptian personages visiting London. All this was before Nur al-Sayyid tendered his resignation and took part in publishing 23 JULY as an organ for the expatriate Egyptian opposition opposing Anwar al-Sadat's tendencies.

When 23 JULY was first published, Nur al-Sayyid's name was shown as board chairman and chief editor. It seems that the combination of the two roles was imposed on him by the circumstances surrounding his acquisition of legal residence in Britain.

As long as 23 JULY was being published, Nur al-Sayyid was known to be one of the people involved in publishing this magazine, which didn't even last one year. The others involved included several well-known Egyptian and Arab writers known for several things, chiefly their opinionatedness and occasional fanaticism, as well as their love of courtesy and their devotion to serving their friends. Throughout the life of 23 JULY, Nur al-Sayyid started off with a weekly column entitled "Just the Facts." Referring back to some of this magazine's issues and reading what he wrote might shed some light on his ideas.

In the sixth issue, published on 2 April 1979, he wrote an article asking the Arab governments to do their patriotic duty and stand by the Arab people in defending themselves against the most vicious colonialist attacks of the

modern era. He said, "We, the sons of Egypt, will be in the vanguard of the Arab people in resisting those who break rank and support neocolonialism." Before that, in the fifth issue, he said, "When al-Sadat signs the ignominious agreement, he will surely know that he is destroying the Arab entity; that he is causing nationalist sentiments to bleed and is breaking his brothers' backs—all to strengthen the enemy's grip."

In the ninth issue he says, "Running around in circles for the government and acting out its tragicomedies and its pseudo-democratic maneuvers is no way to save the nation. The time has come for revolutionary action. This is the only path to deliverance." In the sixteenth issue, Nur al-Sayyid went so far as to say that all honest opposition figures must today "take up arms and begin serious, effective action, by organizing a serious, effective underground revolutionary resistance. They must prove to their brothers in the army that they are acting, that they are in the field with them."

These are some passages from Nur al-Sayyid's writings in 23 JULY, which ceased publication for financial reasons after 24 issues. We believe that these passages are connected with the case, because, even though there are not many of them, they throw light on the ideas of the one who, according to our information, is the person referred to in the Interior Ministry statement as the leader of the group which was arrested.

After 23 JULY ceased publication, the group which had published the magazine lost track of Nur al-Sayyid. It was said in London that he had left Britain for personal reasons which, according to rumors, involved a separation from his wife.

### The Official Dilemma

Let us go back to the important question and reformulate it: was Nur al-Sayyid really the leader of the group which was arrested? We don't want to hold up the course of investigations; we will be satisfied with pointing out several remarks made by observers.

The first such observation is the precise planning and execution which marked the operations which Egypt's Revolution said it was responsible for. When these operations began, several observers went so far as to say that the organization which was behind them was not amateurish.

The second observation, which distresses the Egyptian authorities and puts them in a dilemma, is that according to the information, the group which was arrested included some officers who were still in active service. Underlying this distress is a fear that such a trend might exist within the army. In this connection, some people refer to an event which happened a long time ago—the Egyptian intelligence agency had previously destroyed, or annihilated, the dossiers on elements within the occupied territories who had cooperated with Egyptian

intelligence, at the request of former President Anwar al-Sadat during former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's first visit to Cairo.

The third observation pertains to information now making the rounds, to the effect that the Egyptian authorities prevented any contacts between some of the suspects, as well as contacts between them and defense lawyers. This measure, along with the publication ban, highlights the serious dimensions of the case, as well as the uneasiness felt by Egyptian authorities.

In addition to all these observations, and in spite of the publication ban, the case has actually begun taking on political and popular dimensions. AL-DUSTUR has information to the effect that a group of lawyers representing all the Egyptian parties has agreed to defend the suspects in the Egypt's Revolution case, and has demanded that the trial, which is expected to begin in January 1988, be an open trial before an ordinary judge.

In this context, some people are recalling the days when Egyptian resistance to British occupation of Egypt had flared up, particularly in the Forties, and are saying, "Come on, let's first define the meaning of terrorism."

The question remains: is the Egypt's Revolution organization done for, or does it have branches which are still underground?

08559

**Columnist Comments on 'Democratic Sudan'**  
45040013a Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic  
30 Sep 87 p 52

[Article by Hamid Sulayman: "The Enemies of Democracy"]

[Text] The enemies of democracy among the vipers of writing and politics are gloating over the crisis of the "Democratic Sudan", and are asking themselves whether the popular uprising has accomplished anything, and whether democracy has been beneficial.

It is remarkable that a senior politician such as Dr Hasan al-Turabi feels uneasy, and predicts the likelihood of a military coup, and that former Sudanese Prime Minister Dr al-Janzali fears that the people will not place their confidence in the principles of a popular uprising.

The only one who is calm when commenting on what happened is al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the wizened liberal politician who says that democracy in the Sudan is passing through the same teething pains experienced by any child.

What is the relationship of democracy, or a dictatorship, socialism, or capitalism to the current situation in the Sudan—a situation which has no relation to these ideologies? It is the result of the military buildup in the south, the economy in the north, and the old, established families throughout the Sudan.

The current crisis in the Sudan is a crisis of the administration of a state whose affairs have been assailed by military governments which have sucked the last drop of the nectar from its economy, and whose administrations have been plagued by the personal gain motive at the expense of the national interest.

The Sudan is currently reaping the fruits, and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's bad luck alone is what has placed him in the danger zone at this time. Dr al-Turabi knows well that he is very fortunate because he currently enjoys the luxury of being the opposition at the expense of the misfortune of his stubborn opponent, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, whom fate has designated to carry his country's cross alone to the end.

13286

## ISRAEL

**Changing Role Of IDF Spokesman Discussed**  
44230002a Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew  
30 Sep 87 p 12

[Article by Hanoach Shinman: "They Sell the IDF Like Soap"]

[Text] "If you can't fight the press, join them," says Ya'ir Amiqam, head of Press Affairs in the IDF Spokesman's Office. This office, the public relations branch of the IDF, recently received its own unit insignia, which indicates a growing awareness of the importance of the spokesman's function.

They sell the IDF like soap. That may sound a bit inflammatory, but that is what they do because they have to. The IDF needs public relations to boost its image just like anyone else.

The IDF can promote its interests through media marketing strategies. Ten years ago, maybe even less, that would have sounded terrible. A blow to all our ideals. Even the previous Chief of Staff said that you don't sell the army like soap. Toward the end of his term, he admitted that he was wrong. The Wald report incident was the turning point.

The army understood that silence on the part of the Chief of Staff and the army was interpreted as an admission of guilt. The army understood that an imbalance was created: attacks by Wald and journalists on the army as opposed to the silence imposed upon the IDF spokesman, where the latter knew he should speak out and tell the truth without shame or fear.

The Wald incident, says IDF spokesman Brig Gen Efra'im Lapid, will not be repeated. The IDF has learned its lessons. They are beginning to recognize that the IDF Spokesman is a professional institution and take into account its professional considerations. They do not always have to take its advice, but they need to consider it seriously.

A comparison of activity figures for recent years points up the increasing importance of the Spokesman's unit. In 1984 the Spokesman's office received 996 media requests for IDF interviews, visits to army bases, permission to join IDF units carrying out their duties and information to be used in filing stories. In 1985 the number increased to 3,200 and in 1986, to 3,335. A further increase is expected this year.

In recent years a system has been institutionalized for submitting immediate questions and receiving immediate responses, directly to and from the person in question. Nowadays such questions by telephone to the Spokesman are not considered a departure from the official activity of the Spokesman's office or a bonus on the part of the Spokesman to particular reporters, but rather as an integral part of that framework of activity. The reporters are invited officially to ask and be answered. Today about ten such question and answer sessions are held in the Spokesman's office per day, according to data given out to BAMAHAANE by Eda Tzur, who has coordinated the management of press requests since 1972. She has had experience working with eight IDF Spokesmen.

This change stems primarily from developments in communications, particularly technological ones, that have shortened the lifetime of newsworthy information on the one hand and, on the other, have facilitated better and faster access by journalists to the primary sources of information. This change has brought in its wake a change in attitude as to the proper way to "sell" the IDF.

Today it is understood in the Spokesman's office that if the media are not satisfied, the IDF will suffer in the final analysis. Attempts to muzzle the press were shown to be futile, creating antagonism and mistrust among journalists, both Israeli and foreign, toward the IDF and the IDF Spokesman. In such clashes, the IDF was the only loser.

The structure of the IDF Spokesman's office has a kind built-in genetic defect—the unit has no function at the rank of Colonel. Therefore the head of the unit, that is, the IDF Spokesman himself, cannot advance within the unit. They therefore appoint an army officer from somewhere else. This indicates a kind of under-appreciation, an inferiority in the position of IDF Spokesman as compared to main corps officers, for example. As if to say: "an officer from any corps can be appointed IDF Spokesman since speaking is not a real profession." This structural situation creates problems.

The present IDF Spokesman got to this position after 20 years in intelligence. It turned out that he of all people opened the army up more to the media and was a person who could skillfully manipulate the media. "But the very appointment of an intelligence officer, a soldier who nurtures a suspicious attitude toward public revelation, toward the very function of the IDF Spokesman, can be looked at cynically," says Ya'ir Amiqam, head of the press relations branch within the Spokesman's office.

The aim of the IDF Spokesman is to explain and present the IDF as it is, with its problems, struggles, considerations and, of course, its advantages. This approach, "to think press," is especially evident in the press relations branch, headed by Ya'ir Amiqam, who has 10 years experience as a military correspondent for YEDIOT AHARONOT.

Amiqam is the first correspondent to cross over to the IDF Spokesman's unit directly from the press: "it is impossible to fight the press; it is preferable to join it. We have to use this medium to our own advantage. Without shame. We should not just react, we should initiate; we have to bring the brigade commanders to EREV HADASH. We have to take the initiative in thinking about and publicizing the IDF; we have no choice. If we want to improve our image and have an influence, we have to deal with the matter professionally.

"We should not react so much to press accounts. We should initiate. I have seen army officers who go crazy over every critical headline. The lifetime of those headlines is zero. We should simply duck and wait until they blow over. Reaction will only prolong interest in the matter. Meanwhile we could set up a publicity campaign on, say, career service. The IDF Spokesman knows that we have to do that. But the army is still very 'square.' They are clumsy; they have no idea what the media are all about."

On a concrete level, Amiqam and his colleagues in the Spokesman's unit talk about two problems caused by the lack of coordination between the approach of the Spokesman's unit and the approach of the IDF. The IDF approach is actually beginning to change, but that change is still very little and very slow. The two problems: exaggerated field security and excessive bureaucracy.

Ya'ir Amiqam: "in the latest Air Force attack on terrorist bases in Sidon, first foreign and then Israeli sources claimed that women and children were hit. I looked at the photos of the attack. The photo speaks for itself—the target was located in the middle of orchards, far from any dwelling. Of course, the photo was not published for reasons of field security. Two weeks later we called in the military journalists and showed them the photos, as background and not for publication. Then someone said: wait a minute, why don't you give them to us? The Air force commander and the censor exchanged glances and said: actually, why not? The next day the photos were published in the press. Had they been published two

weeks earlier, a lot of damage could have been prevented. Journalists do not believe us and for good reason. They want to see the picture with their own eyes, the source."

The importance of consultation is enormous in an emergency, during wartime. Here is just one example of a common mistake that could have been avoided during the Lebanon war. A short time after the war started, the IDF was looking for a place to build a temporary internment camp, until the Ansar camp would be ready. A place was found in Sidon. "The place met all our requirements," says Ya'ir Amiqam, "except for 'one side issue': the camp would be located at the entrance to Sidon, on the main highway. Every day hundreds of journalists passed through on their way from Kefar Rosh HaNiqra to Beirut and saw dozens of women crying and tearing their hair out, begging for their husbands to be released. Had they asked us our opinion in advance, it is very possible that the detention camp would not have been located there."

09794

**Begin Joins Fellowship To Save MIA's**  
44230002b Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew  
30 Sep 87 p 42

[Article by Hen Qots: "The Name Will Help"]

[Text] New strength in the ranks of the Fellowship To Save MIA's From The War In Lebanon: Menahem Begin, who was Prime Minister at the time of the war.

Former MK Michael Kleiner:

[Question] Does Begin's joining the Fellowship have any real significance, or is it simply a publicity stunt?

[Answer] The publicity in this instance is important in its own right. Begin's publicity will give it momentum. As a public figure with a name of world renown, Begin can contribute to the Fellowship by establishing contact with various bodies.

[Question] Begin's joining the Fellowship for MIA's is an almost exclusive act since his disappearance from public life. Why now, and why the Fellowship? [Answer] Begin is joining now because they asked him now. He generally reacts to every appeal. He could have said "yes" or "no". Were he to say "no", he would appear callous, so he said "yes."

Even during his period of activity in the underground, Begin was known to be very sensitive on the question of casualties, MIA's, etc. There were whole actions that he called off just because of fear of losing a life, and there were many who were angry at him because of it. His "yes" seems quite natural in that context.

[Question] Could it be that he feels not enough was done for the MIA's during the course of the war? Maybe this is an attempt to atone for the failure?

[Answer] Begin always has guilt feelings. He served as prime minister at the time of the war in Lebanon, and the subject of MIA's is very close to him. As a sensitive person, he deals with the matter in a natural way. Even if the war in Lebanon had been the most glorious in the history of the State of Israel, and there were just 50 wounded and one MIA, Begin would still have felt guilty.

[Question] From your point of view, is this a step in the direction of breaking Begin's veil of silence?

[Answer] No. It is simply a sensitive matter that Begin has reacted to. Just as he has reacted on various issues, he has reacted on this.

Arye Na'or, government secretary during the period of Begin's tenure as Prime Minister, refused to comment. Begin himself remains at home in seclusion, a force for strengthening the Fellowship, surrounded by high walls of silence.

09794

## JORDAN

### Joint Talks With British Review Status Of West Bank

44040012b Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic  
3 Nov 87 p 3

[Text] The Jordanian development plan and economic conditions on the occupied territories were the focus of the talks of Dr Tahir Kan'an, the minister of planning, and Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British foreign minister, yesterday at the Ministry of Planning conference hall.

Dr Tahir Kan'an talked, reviewing the course of development in Jordan and the economic policies the government was following in order to cope with circumstances and new international economic developments, praising the efforts the British government had been exerting in its contributions to successive Jordanian development plans.

The minister of planning in particular emphasized the description of economic, development and social conditions in the occupied territories and constant Israeli attempts and practices to link the economies of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the Israeli economy and to consider them a basic consumer market for Israeli products, since Israeli exports to the occupied territories now represent about 10 percent of its total exports, stating that the Israeli authorities, since the occupation, have not sought to create any new job opportunities in the occupied territories.

Dr Kan'an stated that through these practices about 400,000 Arab citizens have been compelled to emigrate, in addition to about a quarter of a million citizens who emigrated during the occupation.

He expressed the concerns of the citizens on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, especially people working in the agricultural sector, in terms of the limitation on activities and export of their agricultural products and their inability to drill artesian wells.

He pointed out that the subsidy requirements of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip come to about \$180 million a year for the financing of development projects.

Sir Howe [sic] expressed his understanding of the conditions the Arab citizens have been experiencing in the occupied territories. He stated that the British government intended to increase the volume of development lending to Jordan by 50 percent, so that it would come to 15 million pounds sterling during the plan years.

Attending the discussions were Dr Ziyad Fariz, secretary general of the Ministry of Planning, the Jordanian ambassador to Britain, the British ambassador to Amman and a number of directors of departments in the Planning Ministry.

11887

### Interior Minister Discusses Arab Peace Strategy

44040020 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic  
6 Nov 87 pp 31-32

[Interview With Jordanian Interior Minister Raja'i al-Dajjani, by Zaki Shihab: "We Shall Not Negotiate Behind Closed Doors; Anything Other Than a Complete Withdrawal Will Be Rejected By Jordan;" in London, date not specified]

[Text] Jordanian Interior Minister Raja'i al-Dajjani is a politician, an administrator, and an expert in security affairs and Jordanian-Palestinian relations. He gained this experience in the course of his many assignments, which included director of intelligence, director of the crown prince's office, minister of occupied territory affairs, and transportation minister, in addition to his long-standing concern for and pursuit of issues related to the occupied territories. AL-HAWADITH met with him during his official visit to London and conducted the following interview with him.

[Question] How does the Jordanian interior minister think that overall Arab national security can be achieved through a unified strategy?

[Answer] The matter of national security is the broader context for each Arab country's individual national security. They are both related, and the national security of any given Arab country cannot be separated from the



broadier context—the Arab world's national security. The combined security of individual Arab countries constitutes Arab national security.

Today the Arab world is confronted with other forces with which it is fighting and struggling, the chief one being the Zionist forces. This confrontation is taking on a national, not a country-by-country, form. For this reason I am against any talk of countries reacting to and confronting the perils which threaten the Arab nation. Here arises the matter of Arab national security, which means protecting the whole Arab system from external dangers. In this sense, if the fabric of any Arab country is torn, that will be the beginning of evil and negative results. Herein lies the basic element of this national security: Arab solidarity. There must be a minimum degree of solidarity in order that the social fabric may remain whole, and so that all the moves to protect it may be harmonious and inter-related.

The Iranian peril threatens the Arab regimes and exposes the region to deep-rooted sectarian conflicts. The Arab world contains a long-standing sectarian diversity which threatens to tear it apart.

[Question] King Husayn exerted great efforts to bring the Arab kings and presidents together at the emergency 'Amman summit. What were his fundamental starting points?

[Answer] Arab solidarity and unity of Arab ranks are two concepts which are constantly interacting in the king's mind and heart. His belief in the Arab nation is unshaken, and therefore he has always wanted to get all the Arab leaders together—under whatever auspice or umbrella, and at whatever meeting—because such meetings will alleviate the severity of lateral and bi-lateral disagreements. We are speaking of lateral and bilateral disagreements, because we are one nation, which has a common destiny, common interests, common enemies, and a common danger threatening us. Therefore, there is not a single Arab state which is not involved in this peril, and no state can separate itself from this context. The issue is not geographic location as much as it is the existence of a nation which has a civilization, a history and a heritage, and a presence in a strategically important region which has always been exposed to incursions by superpowers throughout the ages.

[Question] After King Husayn's meeting with American Foreign Secretary George Shultz in London, which reportedly failed, major questions arose concerning the reasons for this failure and for the American administration's non-comprehension of the Jordanian proposals.

[Answer] His Majesty the King is continually making every possible effort for the Palestinian cause, in order to at least arrive at some movement on this issue. Since the 1967 war, and during Israel's 20-year stay in the occupied territories, variables and new formulas have emerged. Israel's grip on the occupied territories has

become harsher and more severe, and it has obstructed every attempt to settle the Middle East conflict. The struggle between us and Israel is based on the occupation of the Arab Palestinian homeland. The dispute between us and the Jews is not an old one, but has resulted from their occupation of our land.

At present all efforts are concentrated on reaching a solution to this issue. At this historic stage in the Arab-Zionist struggle, we have now attained an international consensus and agreement that Israeli forces must withdraw from the territories they occupied in 1967. Famous resolutions, Numbers 242 and 338, have been issued by the United Nations and the UN Security Council. How can these resolutions be applied? As far as Jordan is concerned, any talk other than withdrawal from the occupied territories is empty talk which will not lead to any results. There is a consensus that an international conference must be held, because such a conference, attended by the five superpowers who are permanent members of the Security Council, would be a practical tool through which a solution to the conflict might be reached. This international presence would not be so much a "ceremonial" presence as an effective presence testifying to what is going on. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir has announced that he is not concerned with the proposed format for the international conference. As for ourselves, the negotiations are not an end or a goal in themselves; the goal is withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967. Jordan will never negotiate behind closed doors, or as a third or fourth party.

[Question] What did Shultz bring this time that was new? Is it true that he presented a new Israeli plan to the Jordanian king?

[Answer] I am not informed as to what Shultz said, but I can speak of clear-cut official stands, and I have never heard any Israeli official speak of withdrawing. All the talk centers around direct negotiations. But we have never yet heard Shimon Peres speak of withdrawal. If we do sit down, what will we negotiate? The subject is clear. There is no confusion or obscurity. We in Jordan will never compete with anyone over the Palestinian cause. We are at the heart of the Palestinian cause, people and land. It is unacceptable to speak of it in a local sense, because it is the responsibility of every Arab citizen, from Tangiers and the Sahara to the heart of Jerusalem.

[Question] What is the story on the plan to develop the occupied territories?

[Answer] The question of the development plan has several aspects; some say many aspects. Unfortunately, our idea of devotion to and solicitude for our people and citizens in the occupied territories differs from other people's ideas.

The others look upon this matter as if we were in a race with the PLO; as if we were competing for the love of our citizens in the occupied territories. Are our citizens mere

commodities? This is not the case at all. We want to help the people in the occupied territories stand firm against Zionist pressure and Israel. For us, the issue is not competition. Then too, neither the PLO or any other party has paid, contributed or given the West Bank as much as we have. We pay the salaries of the employees, be they teachers or administrators, who look after the affairs of the people in the West Bank. We are not paying individuals, nor are we committed to any one group, because we are not an agency, group or organization—we are a state, and we deal as a state. Committees have been formed to study the assistance needs of the West Bank. We are dealing with popular authorities, not individuals, so that the benefits may be more widespread and the aid more all-inclusive.

[Question] But there is a committee to support the perseverance of the people of the occupied territories, which has Arab financing. Has this committee been successful? Does what the PLO is doing on this level conflict with Jordanian efforts in this regard?

[Answer] This area is not one of my specialties. There is a joint Palestinian-Jordanian committee which came out of the Baghdad summit. At the time, it was agreed to establish a joint committee to supervise this agreement, provided it was given enough money to cover expenses.

At the last meeting of the committee, we received some money from Saudi Arabia. We called a meeting right away and reviewed the needs in light of the schedule of allocations, and we decided what would be disbursed and spent. Every agency was given the money it needed in light of what was available. However, we restricted no one. We welcome whoever wants to help the development plan, be he Jordanian or otherwise.

[Question] What are the broad outlines for cooperation between Jordan and the PLO, especially now that coordination has been suspended and the 'Amman agreement has been cancelled?

[Answer] There are no outlines, broad or narrow. What should I coordinate with the PLO? I will not compete with anyone when it comes to the Palestinian cause. At the beginning of the 11 February agreement, which was an interpretation or tool for the Fez agreements on which there was Arab unanimity, all our efforts went towards getting a seat for the PLO at the international conference. Resolutions 242 and 338 refer to the Arab states, and the PLO is not a state. As I said, the goal was to get a seat at the conference for the PLO, which, if it could be obtained, would be an outstanding point.

[Question] In light of what you said, how will the matter of Palestinian representation at the international conference be resolved?

[Answer] When we speak of the PLO, representation, and the like, we are speaking in the sense that the PLO represents the cause, and therefore shares responsibility

with the other Arab states. The question is not one of dividing peoples. The PLO is a struggling construction the purpose of which is to liberate Palestine—something we share in. There is no difference between the Palestinian, the Jordanian, the Iraqi, the Syrian and the Lebanese; we are all one people, one nation.

The people on the West Bank are Jordanian citizens. The difference is over what type of representation. God willing, when the land is liberated and no foreign foot stands on it, this will become a family matter. I believe that to examine this matter now, making it bigger than it is, would not benefit the nation's interests.

[Question] What is the Jordanian government's stand on the new party announced in the occupied territories, which includes members of the "village leagues" and others?

[Answer] The village leagues are reprehensible. Israel created them, they failed, and the people never accepted them. Nothing is true but the truth. What is Jordan's role? We are against all such things, village leagues or otherwise. We want the people to stand firm and to be in a position where they can resist Israeli pressure. All of this is an example of erroneous thinking and unclean dealing with the Palestinian cause and with the people who are under occupation.

[Question] The Jordanian Interior Ministry has been exceptionally active in fighting drugs. What is the nature of its activities?

[Answer] Drugs are a serious issue, the scope of which has expanded as a result of increased usage of narcotics in some societies, particularly Western societies.

We in the Arab world, and particularly in Jordan, are not affected by a so-called narcotics phenomenon or problem. Jordan is like a "transit" zone for smuggling narcotics, and we are aware of this dangerous situation. In 1973, we established a special department to fight narcotics, and it plays an active role. In cooperation with friendly and fraternal countries, we have been able to find a real niche for the Jordanian efforts in this regard. International records show the extent of smuggling and the volume of narcotics seized in various parts of the world; Jordan played a part in their exposure. Narcotics cannot be combatted, or smuggling stopped, through local measures alone; it requires international interaction and cooperation.

8559

#### **National Fund Carries Out Vocational Training Programs**

44040012c Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic  
2 Nov 87 p 2

[Text] At a meeting held yesterday under the chairmanship of Eng Khalid al-Hajj Hasan, minister of labor and social development, the National Aid Fund board of directors discussed a number of subjects related to the fund's activity.

The board became apprised of the report by the committee assigned to study organizational instructions for receiving donations. A fund general director was assigned to set out an executive plan of action and submit it to the board for study.

The board also read the report of the fund's general manager on vocational accreditation projects which have been carried out in the various service areas of the fund's branches, which come to 107 in number.

He also pointed out that these projects concentrated in the first place on the commercial service projects concerned with the sale of foodstuffs and everyday consumer goods, while the agricultural production projects assumed second place.

The minister emphasized the advanced vocational training of qualified individuals and their provision with the basic skills and adequate expertise for the vocational project and asserted that accreditation was not made before it was ascertained that they had acquired such expertise.

He also stressed the need to de-emphasize the traditional accreditation projects, emphasize agricultural production projects in qualitative and quantitative terms and give them a development dimension through the development of collective productive and agricultural accreditation projects for these individuals so they could participate in the development process and increase national income.

The minister advocated attention to the performance of social studies in the areas of the south and the desert.

11887

### **Al-Karak 3-Year Village Development Plan Reviewed**

44040012a Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic  
4 Nov 87 p 9

[Text] Eng 'Abd-al-Majid al-Dhunaybat, director of municipality and village affairs and the environment in al-Karak Governorate, said that the development plan for the municipality and village councils in the kingdom, which has been set out by a specialized committee from the Ministry of Municipal and Village Affairs and the Environment in accordance with the Council of Ministers decree and includes the improvement of local council conditions from the administrative, financial and technical standpoints in order to enable them to continue their course of development, is to be considered a basic buttress in upgrading these councils' level and raising their ability to carry out their projects according to the capabilities and material resources available to them and development of the services offered to citizens in them.

Al-Dhunaybat added in a meeting with PETRA's correspondent in al-Karak that the appropriate committee met this October with the heads of the village councils in the governorate and the Districts of al-Qasr and South al-Mazar and a discussion was held on the budgets of these councils, the possibilities for internal and external financing to carry out the service and productive projects cited in their plan by the council fund or loans and the priorities for carrying out these projects by plan years.

Al-Dhunaybat said that the total cost of the service projects in the plan of the village councils in the governorate for the 3 years 1987-89 would come to 1,173,000 dinars.

### **The Mumiya Village Council**

Al-Dhunaybat stated that the Mumiya village council plan included the building and paving of streets and the construction of sidewalks and borders for them at a cost of 17,000, general appropriations for 5,000 dinars, the construction of a building for the council at a cost of 13,000 dinars, the provision of lighting for the streets and a fence for the village cemetery at a cost of 7,500 dinars and the construction of commercial warehouses for 15,000 dinars and that the plan for the Manshiyah Abu Hamur village council includes the building and paving of streets at a cost of 35,500 dinars, general appropriations and compensations, 15,000 dinars, the provision of lighting for streets, 1,500 dinars, general appropriations, 3,500 dinars, the provision of lighting for the streets and a fence for the cemetery, 3,000 dinars, and the purchase of a garbage dump truck, 6,000 dinars.

### **Jawza**

The Jawza village council plan includes the building and paving of streets and construction of retaining walls at a cost of 60,000 dinars, general appropriations at 12,000 dinars, the construction of a building for the council at 15,000 dinars, the provision of lighting for the streets and a fence for the cemetery at 4,000 dinars and the purchase of a garbage dump truck, 10,000 dinars.

The Zahum village council plan includes the building and paving of and provision of lighting for streets at a cost of 5,000 dinars.

The Fayfa village council plan includes the building and paving of streets and provision of lighting, 31,000 dinars, and the Midyan village council plan the building and paving of streets, 14,000 dinars, and lighting for the streets and a fence for the cemetery, 10,000 dinars.

### **Al-Rashidiyah**

The al-Rashidiyah village council plan includes the building and paving of streets at a cost of 30,000 dinars, general appropriations, 6,000 dinars, the construction of a building for the council, 15,000 dinars, the purchase of a garbage dump truck, 6,000 dinars, and the provision of

lighting for streets, 1,500 dinars. The Saka village council plan includes the building and paving of streets at a cost of 35,000 dinars, general appropriations, 4,000 dinars, and the provision of lighting for streets and a fence for the cemetery, 6,000 dinars.

### **Samra**

The Samra village council plan includes the building and paving of streets, 3,500 dinars, general appropriations, 3,000 dinars, and the construction of fences and retaining walls, 5,000 dinars.

The al-Ghuwayr village council plan includes the building and paving of streets and the construction of sidewalks and borders for them at a cost of 27,000 dinars and the provision of lighting for streets and the purchase of garbage containers, 3,000 dinars.

The Rakin village council plan includes the building and paving of streets and provision of lighting for them, 5,000 dinars, and the construction of a council building, 7,000 dinars.

### **Buqay' al-Aghwat**

The Buqay' al-Aghwat town council plan includes the building and paving of streets and the construction of retaining walls for them at a cost of 19,000 dinars and the construction of fences for 5,500 dinars.

The 'Aynun village council plan includes the building and paving of streets at a cost of 16,000 dinars, general appropriations, 4,000 dinars, the construction of a council building, 14,000 dinars, and the provision of electricity for the streets and a fence for the village cemetery, 15,500 dinars.

The al-Ma'muniyah village council plan also includes the building and paving of streets at a cost of 24,000 dinars, general appropriations, 7,000 dinars, and the provision of lighting for the streets and a fence for the al-Rayyah cemetery, 4,500 dinars.

The al-Hayawiyah village council plan includes the building and paving of streets and provision of lighting for them, 27,500 dinars, and the al-'Adnaniyah village council plan the building and paving of streets at a cost of 7,500 dinars, general appropriations, 39,000 dinars, a council building, 8,000 dinars, and provision of lighting for the streets and a fence for the village cemetery, 5,000 dinars.

### **Murud**

The Murud village council plan includes the building and paving of streets and construction of sidewalks and borders for them at a cost of 34,000 dinars, the construction of a council building, 12,000 dinars, and the provision of lighting for the streets and a fence for the cemetery, 5,000 dinars.

The al-Wadi al-Abyad village council plan includes the building and paving of streets at a cost of 29,000 dinars and the provision of lighting for the streets and construction of a water tank, 5,500 dinars.

The al-Yarut village council plan has included the building and paving of streets and construction of sidewalks and borders for them at a cost of 24,000 dinars, general appropriations, 14,000 dinars, the provision of lighting for and beautification of streets, 5,000 dinars, and the appropriation of a plot of land and the construction of a village council building on it, 45,000 dinars.

The Amra' village plan includes the building and paving of streets at a cost of 5,000 dinars, the construction of a council building, 15,000 dinars, and the provision of lighting for the streets, 2,000 dinars.

### **Shayhan**

The Shayhan village council plan includes the building and paving of streets and the construction of sidewalks and borders for them at a cost of 27,000 dinars, general appropriations, 7,000 dinars, the construction of a park, 2,000 dinars, and the provision of lighting for the streets and a fence for the village cemetery, 3,000 dinars.

The al-Jad'a village council plan includes the building and paving of streets at a cost of 10,000 dinars and the provision of lighting for the streets and other services, 4,000 dinars.

The Mughayyar village council plan includes general appropriations and maintenance of streets at a cost of 6,000 dinars and the Musa'ar village council plan includes the building and paving of streets, 18,500 dinars, general appropriations and the provision of lighting for streets, 4,000 dinars, and the establishment of a council building, 9,000 dinars.

### **Al-Hashimiyah**

The al-Hashimiyah village council plan also includes the building and paving of streets at a cost of 38,000 dinars, general appropriations, 3,000 dinars, the construction of a building for the council, 19,000 dinars, and the provision of lighting for the streets and a fence for the village cemetery, 7,000 dinars.

The Sawl village council plan includes the building and paving of streets at a cost of 30,000 dinars, general appropriations, 3,000 dinars, the erection of a council building, 15,000 dinars, and the provision of lighting for the streets, 2,000 dinars.

The al-Harithiyah village council plan includes the building and paving of streets at a cost of 23,000 dinars, the construction of a council building, 12,000 dinars, the provision of lighting for the streets and general appropriations, 5,000 dinars, and the purchase of a garbage dump truck, 5,000 dinars.

The Jahra and al-Mujaydil village council plan includes the building and paving of streets at a cost of 15,000 dinars, the construction of a council building, 15,500 dinars, general appropriations and various services, 9,000 dinars, and the provision of lighting for streets, 3,000 dinars.

The Majra village council plan, the building and paving of streets at a cost of 13,500 dinars, general appropriations and provision of lighting for streets, 4,000 dinars, the construction of a council building, 10,000 dinars, and the purchase of a garbage dump truck, 5,000 dinars.

The Muhyi village council plan includes the building and paving of streets and construction of retaining walls for them at a cost of 25,500 and the completion of the council building and a wall for the cemetery, 3,500 dinars.

### The Accomplishments

Eng al-Dhunaybat also reviewed the projects the municipal and village councils completed in the governorate and the Districts of al-Qasr and South al-Mazar in cooperation with the department during the past months of this year, costing a total of 354,647 dinars. These include the construction of a meeting hall in the town of al-Rabbah with an area of 438 square meters and a cost of 48,856 dinars, the construction of two fences for the general auditorium and park in the town of al-Rabbah, 500 meters long, at a cost of 14,721 dinars, the laying and paving of 13,000 square meters of the streets of Sarfa at a cost of 17,850 dinars, the building and paving of 11,000 square meters of the streets of Faqu' at a cost of 850 dinars and the construction of the al-Hashimiyah village council building, on an area of 155 square meters, at a cost of 15,109 dinars.

The accomplishments also include the building and paving of 10,000 square meters of Jawza village streets at a cost of 28,240 dinars, the building and paving of 18,000 square meters of al-Mazar streets at a cost of 20,000 dinars, the construction of schools in the town of 'Ayy on an area of 1,242 square meters at a cost of 102,973 dinars, the building and paving of 7,000 square meters of Muhyi streets at a cost of 10,430 dinars, the building and paving of 16,000 square meters of Ghawr al-Mazra'ah streets at a cost of 17,505 dinars, the building and paving of 14,000 square meters of al-Tibah streets at a cost of 21,700 dinars, the construction of a school in the village of Muhyi on an area of 180 square meters at a cost of 23,700 dinars, the construction of a fence 500 meters long for the al-Jalmah preparatory school at a cost of 1,254 dinars and the laying of village roads with an area of 17,700 square meters in the various areas of the governorate and population concentrations there at a cost of 16,859 dinars.

## LEBANON

### Fadlallah Speaks Out Against Kidnapping, Extortion

44040018a Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 24 Oct 87 p 4

[Text] His Eminence al-Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah has stated that "in the economic sense, the Lebanese economy is still good." He referred to the toppling of NATO plans for Lebanon with the blowing-up of the Marine and the French headquarters, and called on the Lebanese to "store up our strength against world arrogance. We should not be afraid, because we have resources and arms."

His Eminence Fadlallah delivered the Friday sermon at the Imam Rida mosque in Bi'r al-'Abd. He started out by discussing the anniversary of the Prophet Muhammad's death and his deeds, which the teachings of the Qur'an have made obligatory. He said, "We must know the people's circumstances and act accordingly. The Prophet stressed that we must not use force unless it is right to do so. I want to caution all those young, committed Muslims who might play the Devil with the weapons they hold that weapons are a responsibility, and they must not use them except in ways pleasing to God. If you use them in a way which does not please responsible people, or God, God will be angry with you. Whoever finds that he cannot bear the responsibility of weapons in order to protect the people from himself and his weapons must not bear arms, because he will become a danger. He must not be like some people who might pretend to be praying and fasting but are actually forming gangs to rob and attack the people."

"We know that all such people, no matter what group they belong to, are renegades in the eyes of Islam. Anyone who robs or kidnaps a person in order to extort money from his family; anyone who gets his comrades together to plunder the people and convince each other that they have a legal sanction to do so; these are all renegades. Whoever sanctions seizing the people's money and extorting and robbing them when a person is kidnapped to get money from his family is not a believer, no matter what group he belongs to. He has nothing to do with us, because God does not want us to hide the thief and the robber. Any movement or organization or party which conceals such people has deviated from Islam. Islam does not cover up gangs and thieves, because such people must be confronted and brought to trial."

"Whoever cheats a man must return the money of which he has duped him. People's money and honor are just as sacred as the Holy Month of Muharram. No Islamic source speaks of stealing the Muslims' and the people's money. We must protect the people's money. There were some young men in Europe who sought the opinion of Imam al-Khomeini and Imam al-Khu'i as to whether it

was permissible to take the money of any European or anyone else. The imams' opinion was that this was not permissible. We must communicate this to everyone we know.

"The Prophet told people, 'If you study my life, what I did, and the relations I established, you will be unable to find any breach whereby you can deviate from Islam. I have allowed only what the Qur'an permits, and forbade only what the Qur'an forbids. All my life I have followed the Qur'an's line.' This brings up two points. First, the leaders must behave openly before the people. They must ask the people to examine their conduct and compare their words and their deeds. If the people see any deviation in any of the leader's statements, they must question him, and he must respond, and if he made a mistake he must take it back. The man responsible for society belongs not only to himself, but to the nation. He must follow the line which is demanded of him. He is not infallible; rather, he must review his steps and if he made a mistake he must take back what he did. He must not be above criticism; he must humble himself before God in order to be secure in his responsibility to the people. In everything he did, the Prophet wanted to tell the people, 'Ask your leaders to give you a personal, financial and political accounting of themselves. There is no disgrace in this.'

"The second point is that anyone who assumes any degree of responsibility for Muslims in any Islamic area, and calls himself a Muslim, must not carry out his policy, his war or peace, or his general relations without basing them on the Qur'an. He must review his actions and ask whether they are pleasing to God or not. He must ask whether the Qur'an says he can do this or not. The people must make him answerable as to whether Islam guides his plan, his action, his party and his organization. Islam must be the basis. The people must ask whether the Qur'an permits or forbids an action. Thus the people must demand that he not act according to any other basis than the Qur'anic standards of allowability and prohibition, because whoever acts according to non-Qur'anic standards of lawfulness or forbiddenness does not deserve to hold any responsibility over the Muslims. He must act on Islamic bases."

Fadlallah went on to discuss general matters, saying, "Given the general Islamic situation, we are faced with the fact that Islam, represented by the Islamic revolution led by Imam al-Khomeini may God protect him, is standing on one side, while the rest of the arrogant world, big and small countries alike, is standing on the other side, exerting pressure on this revolution in order to subjugate and enslave it. However, this revolution was born in the living heart of Islam on the Tenth of Muharram, and adopted the slogans of Husayn. Husayn said, 'How far we are from being subjugated,' and the cries of the revolutionaries rang out with him everywhere. Husayn started out from a position of power in spite of his few numbers. Everyone's heart stops and spirit weakens when America smashes a throne or any

other position of power, but the voice of the revolutionary, which with God's help is growing louder, will never die down once it rings out. America strikes, and then sends a message that it wants to stop. The voice is ringing out, and we must respond and stand up. We shall respond in a certain way. The entire arrogant world is crying out. The embassies are acting without knowing where Iran will strike. Iran has issued a threat, and once it does so it will strike. It is making threats, aware that the glory of Islam is in the balance. Once it threatens, it must strike. Therefore, if it moves it will move with deliberation and planning. We know that there are deep aspects of political planning which prevent the arrogant ones from freely carrying out their plans, actions and threats. We must remember what God Almighty said: 'Do not weep or be sad; you are all the higher for being believers.'

"The believer must be higher because of his belief in God. He must tell himself that he is stronger not because of something in his personality but because of the nature of the strength of faith connected with God. The believer must tell himself this, and act on this basis. Otherwise, we will not be able to plant our feet firmly on the ground, and the arrogant ones will surround us on all sides. Today we must remember 23 October, when two young men were able, through their faith and their feelings of strength from God, to sabotage NATO positions at the headquarters of the Marines and the French. When they thought of America and France, they did not flinch in fear; they were aware that God's strength and the fear of God were stronger, and went forth with a smile and brought down NATO's plan for Lebanon.

"When it faced the war ships of America and the other countries, Iran wanted to tell the world that this was occupation, not just battleships and ships coming to the Gulf. This occupation of the Gulf is trying to hinder freedom of navigation and self-determination, but Islam is dealing with it the same way it deals with any occupation. The Gulf belongs to the Muslims, and the Muslims must be responsible for it. If America seriously wants to protect navigation, all it has to do is tell its agents not to strike at Iranian ships, thus bringing the matter to a close. But it wants to subjugate the Muslims and impose its own conditions on them. On this basis, the issue is moving forward in a calculated manner, and there is no need for us to fear the blarings of the propaganda trumpets, which are intended to weaken our spirit and our resolve. We must always say, 'Don't weep; God will protect us.' This is the secret of the Islamic movement. This is what it must adhere to in confronting arrogance, Zionism, and domestic injustice. We must inspire ourselves with strength, and we must remember that the other side is human. While the others have strong weapons, we also have resources and weapons, and we are in a position of strength.

"In confronting the tribulations of the domestic crisis, we must pull out the thorn with our own fingernails. This is a new war, in which international and regional agencies are working together to subjugate us, because they

have been unable to subdue us in the security and political sense. Economics is part of policy. To all those who say that the economic crisis must be kept separate from the political crisis, we say that the crisis has its political dimensions. In the economic sense, the Lebanese economy is still in good shape, but some people are trying to impose an economic crisis in order to bring down the people.

"We must understand the nature of the game. We must live with economic ruination just as we are living with political and military ruin."

8559

**Shi'ites Urged To Unite Under Supreme Council**  
44040018b Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic  
24 Oct 87 p 14

[Text] Following his official visit to Algeria, and his private trips to Paris and London for medical treatment, Vice President of the Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din returned to Lebanon, determined to try to regroup the political decision-making power of the Shi'ites in Lebanon. He is convinced that "Lebanon, and the entire region, is facing extremely serious developments. Should the situation of the Shi'ites in Lebanon continue in its present state of fragmentation and division, the future of this sect will be very poor."

Shaykh Shams-al-Din informed the people he visited after his return of his point of view, saying, "the Shi'ite forces in Lebanon have been shown to be incapable of comprehending the Shi'ite situation and uniting this sect's political decision-making." He added that the Amal movement, Hizballah, and the Rijal-al-Din movement had all failed to become a framework for this decision-making. Now, the solution is to get everyone back to working through the Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council, by making this supreme Shi'ite body the source of all decision-making; in other words, all these political, religious and military powers would become part of the council. Through it they would be able to operate, take part in making political decisions which would serve the sect and the unity of the Islamic ranks, and thus formulate the appropriate political stands.

8559

**Analyst Views Interaction Between Economic, Political Factors**  
44040007 Paris AL-A WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic  
Sep 87 pp 8-9

[Article by Dr Ilyas Saba: "Economics and Politics in Lebanon"]

[Text] Debate is raging over the interaction between politics and economics and whether it is possible to alleviate or reduce the economic crisis in Lebanon without first reaching a political accord among parties to the

conflict. This debate even developed into a mass of economic proposals emanating from all sides, whether knowledgeable or otherwise, in attempts to evade responsibility, ward off accusations of negligence, and throw the ball into the other man's court. We shall attempt in this article to shed some light on the interaction between economics and politics in the current crisis while avoiding narrow political interests in as much as possible.

1. The current economic crisis predates the Lebanese war. The Lebanese economy, even in the early seventies, suffered several problems manifested as social unrest, strikes, relatively higher cost of living, and inadequate public utilities such as roads, ports, telephones, mail, etc. The first petroleum boom highlighted the weaknesses of the Lebanese economy whose structure, dictated by conditions in the region in the aftermath of World War II (especially in the fifties and sixties), was no longer suitable to the developments of the early seventies, especially after the first oil price explosion from September 1973 to January 1974.

2. The Lebanese war, which began in 1975, masked the infrastructure crisis as the problems and worries of the vicious war and its impact on the economy took priority in peoples' minds. The two-year war (April 1975 to November 1976), which ended when Arab preemptive forces entered Lebanon, destroyed many material means of production such as infrastructure and industrial, agricultural, and service institutions. It also led to the migration of many Lebanese cadres and talents as well as of many Lebanese, Arab, and foreign economic institutions. This caused a considerable 30 percent decline in the gross domestic product. This should have led to a corresponding decline in the Lebanese standard of living and to similar negative signs in economic indicators such as the rates of inflation and foreign exchange but that did not happen. Prices were inflated and the lira softened within very narrow margins inconsistent with national economic losses. Individual income rose, despite a decline in domestic product, because of remittances by expatriate Lebanese (especially in oil producing countries) and because of the influx of political and similar funds into Lebanon.

3. The situation did not change in the aftermath of the two-year war and until the Israeli invasion which had an obvious effect on the course of Lebanese economy during the war. The Israeli invasion started a new wave of destruction of infrastructure and investment in all Lebanese sectors which was not totally accidental or unintentional. The Israeli assault and occupation was a mortal blow to the Lebanese economy. The mountain war, the incidents in the southern suburb of Beirut and of February 1984, and the May 1983 agreement with Israel destroyed whatever national institutions were left and fractured the Lebanese marketplace into several small entities at odds with each other. Barriers were erected against the movement of people and goods from one area into another. Thousands of Lebanese migrated



to other areas. Foreign immigration increased, especially by highly qualified and capable individuals and institutions. The domestic product declined at an even faster rate that could not be compensated for by expatriate remittances which slowed down as a result of external factors such as the global recession, the decline in oil prices and the consequent economic recession in oil producing countries. The treasury suffered unprecedented budgetary deficits which increased at an alarming pace not only because of a decline in the state's revenues as a result of arbitrary action by those in control but also primarily because of increasing national expenditures for projects that lacked any economic, developmental, or even social priority and because of huge military outlays as the state became party to the conflict for the first time since the war started.

4. All this coincided with a grave mistake by the Central Bank which made it a practice in 1983 and 1984 to use its own reserves, rather than the market, to supply the country's foreign exchange needs. Those reserves were therefore exhausted by the end of 1984 and consequently the bank lost the capability of interfering in the discount markets to which the public sector had to suddenly turn. The Central Bank's inability to intervene started a landslide in the exchange rate of the lira late in 1984.

5. The appointment of a new management for the Bank of Lebanon did not materially affect the deterioration in the rate of the lira, especially since the Central Bank spent most of 1985 replenishing its foreign reserves by buying on the local markets. Early in 1986, the Central Bank began pursuing discount and monetary policies in order to counteract pressures on the lira and was in effect swimming upstream. Its performance was frequently amateurish, confrontational, and lacked careful study. The state deficit continued to escalate without being stopped. The Central Bank reserves were exhausted once again. Mounting pressure on the rate of exchange continued as a result of the treasury's escalating deficit.

6. Officials made unsuccessful attempts in the second half of 1986 to halt the tremendous deterioration in the lira's exchange rate and purchasing power. Their efforts were bound to fail because they were either misguided, superficial, fragmented, or ill-timed. This led to total loss of official credibility and ability to halt the collapse. It also led to great alarm over the future of the national currency and even of the national economy, causing the state of almost total panic prevailing today and the virtual total abandonment of the Lebanese lira.

7. What we suffer today is therefore the result of several cumulative factors. It was originally and basically a structural problem compounded by a decline in the GDP as a result of the war and aggravated by the Israeli occupation and the corresponding internal and external developments as well as their economic-political impact. The immediate cause for the collapse in the rate of the lira and for the festering high cost of living was the

escalating treasury deficit caused by fiscal irresponsibility, government extravagance, and arbitrary handling of national revenues. All this was coupled with psychological factors concerning people's future expectations. Misguided and useless efforts and confrontations between those in power and public and private organizations led to loss of confidence in the government and in the future of the currency and the regime and its agencies.

8. Given that those are the manifestations of and the reasons for the current economic crisis, it is evident that the solution is multifaceted and complex. A solution must be able to impact the structure of the Lebanese economy and, in the initial stages, reverse the escalating national deficit, if not terminate it altogether by instituting fundamental monetary and fiscal reforms. Such reforms would be useless without profound measures to create a psychological shock, change the current expectations of the Lebanese, and restore people's confidence in their officials, institutions, and their economic future. Naturally, this can only be accomplished by making fundamental changes in the political, monetary, and economic leadership or at least, initially, in the centers of power. This would necessitate a major political decision because those responsible for the past and present conditions in the country will not voluntarily carry out the needed reforms, especially if they are profiting by the current deterioration. We must therefore wait for the Lebanese to reach their level of tolerance or for society to reach its boiling point.

12945

## SAUDI ARABIA

**New Nationwide Electricity Hookup Reviewed**  
*44040025a Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 1 Nov 87 p 2*

[Article by Hani Wafa]

[Text] The high tension lines in the kingdom (132 kilovolts and above) came to about 5,650 km in total length, offering a major indication of the orientation toward forming an integrated system inside each electricity company concession area and throughout the kingdom.

An official source in the Ministry of Industry and Electricity stated this to AL-RIYAD in the course of his conversation with AL-RIYAD, in which he replied to a number of questions on this subject. He said:

"One of the ministry's most important objectives is to improve productivity in the electricity sector in an ongoing manner at the lowest cost. It has begun by merging the small electric companies and turning them into larger ones in the framework of the provinces, establishing the General Electricity Organization and forming the unified Saudi electricity companies in the Eastern, Central, Southern and Western Provinces. These companies have pursued their tasks and therefore



it has been possible for them to develop the areas of generation and transmission and distribution lines within their concession areas.

"Eastern Electricity has managed to link up the electricity generating installations there to their distribution sites by means of a unified 1150-kilovolt and 230-kilovolt system and therefore provide the Eastern Province with a 230- and 380- kilovolt voltage hookup to the city of Riyadh.

"In the Western Province, it has linked up Medina, Yanbu', Rabigh, Jiddah and Mecca and the desalination plants in Yanbu' and Jiddah with 380-kilovolt systems, as well as linking Jiddah, Mecca and Ta'if up via 110 kilovolts.

"In the Southern Province, the main towns situated in the Tihama Province have been linked up via 132 kilovolts as well, Bishah and Sabt al-'Alaya have been interconnected and Abha has been linked up with al-Shaqiq via 132 kilovolts.

"The General Electricity Organization is also constructing a 132-kilovolt system in the areas of Tabuk, al-Aflaj and Wadi al-Dawasir as part of the central projects in these areas, as well as constructing 110-kilovolt systems in the Yanbu' area.

"Connecting electricity to high and extremely high voltage use has numerous technical and economic benefits, including the elimination of small generating plants, reduction of generating reserves and reliance on the production of electricity from major generating plants with large generating capacities, in addition to the possibility of exchanging power among electricity facilities and covering all power deficits that might arise in a region, and also benefitting from differences in temperature, such as that between Tihamah and al-Bahah and Jizan and 'Asir."

Concerning the point the electrical services provided by the electricity companies have reached in accordance with the ministry's plans to bring electricity to the various provinces and cities of the kingdom:

The source said that during the previous development plans, the General Electricity Organization and the electricity companies managed to establish a number of electricity projects in various areas. The electrical services included many agricultural settlements, villages and towns which totalled about 3,500 by late 1986. The people benefitting from electricity at the end of the first development plan numbered 351,531, came to 872,054 at the end of the second development plan, and increased to 1,757,933 customers at the end of the third development plan. By late 1987, they came to about 2 million in number. This is in addition to the number of electrical projects being carried out with the goal of bringing electricity service to new clients, such as the central Wadi al-Dawasir project, the al-Aflaj central

project, the al-Rayn project in the Central Province, the Tabuk central project in the Northern Province and the Yanbu' al-Bahr and Yanbu' al-Nakhl systems project in the Western Province.

Concerning the results of the studies which were carried out to investigate connecting the kingdom to the Cooperation Council countries electrically from the standpoint of engineering and economic feasibility:

The source said that the deputy ministers of electricity in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries had in their first meeting recommended the preparation of a study on the economic feasibility and strategic benefits of connecting the electrical systems of the council countries to a unified electric system. The study was assigned to a specialized consulting group. The group has completed this study, it has been submitted to a specialized committee for discussion and is still in the course of discussion and investigation on the part of the council countries.

On the extent to which electric power generating capacity has risen and the point electricity sales in the kingdom have reached:

He said, "Actual generating capacities attributable to the electricity companies and General Electricity Organization projects, be they of the diesel, gas or steam types, have developed greatly in past years. The total capacities in 1975 were 848 megawatts, rising to 5,904 megawatts in 1980. The increase has continued, since the total capacities in 1987 came to 14,644 megawatts.

"As to power sold, that was 3,760,009 megawatt hours in 1975 and rose to about 48 million megawatt hours in 1987 — that is, it increased more than 12 times over.

"According to the fourth development plan, electrical programs and projects exist to bring electric service to more than 800,000 customers in the plan years. Out of that, delivery to 383,945 customers has been achieved in the 2 and a half years since the beginning of the fourth development plan, reaffirming that the delivery of electricity to citizens is taking place in accordance with the plans set out for that, in addition to 8,000 new megawatts, the addition of 2,177 megawatts of which was realized from the beginning of the fourth development plan to late summer 1987, and the construction of transmission systems of various voltages to transmit power from its sources of production to its distribution sites."

11887

#### **Study Predicts Intensification Of Saudization Program**

44040008 Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic  
16 Sep 87 pp 43-45

[Text] From time to time, the "issue of graduates" and questions about their future and the economy's ability to absorb them under economic change are raised.

What is the nature of that problem? Is there in fact unemployment? Or will it emerge in the future?

Can the national economy absorb those citizens by creating job opportunities either in the government or private sector and replacing foreign labor?

Many questions are being raised about this issue.

This is what this article will discuss based on available information and a study prepared by the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce.

Recently there has been a large increase in the number of university graduates, a number that is growing year after year due to an expansion in the kingdom's college education policy which has offered various kinds of assistance to education. The kingdom now has seven universities that turn out 10,000 graduates a year to join the development process, a rate that is expected to grow in coming years. This situation has raised fears that these graduates would become a surplus on the market because of a dearth of job opportunities, both in government and the private sector. But quite the opposite is true. All indicators say that the kingdom's economy is capable of absorbing all graduates, at least for the remaining years of the 4th development plan, and that it is still using foreign labor, a large part of which is expected to be replaced by local resources. Furthermore, the business sector is expected to expand in the next phase, thus allowing it to absorb graduates. What this process needs is a measure of coordination on the part of concerned government agencies and some effort by the private sector in order to avoid any problems that may arise in providing employment for graduates and to come out with a systematic plan to absorb graduates in the government and private sectors.

#### Saudi Civil Labor Force Expectations during the 4th Plan:

There is a strong and direct relationship between economic growth and labor in the kingdom. During the previous plan, the 3rd plan to be exact, available job opportunities outnumbered Saudi citizens who had joined the labor market, hence the reliance on foreign labor to close the gap between supply and demand. In the 4th plan alone, plans have been made for the labor force to meet the demands of change in the economic structure and to help achieve high efficiency in the various economic sectors, which means higher productivity whereby greater objectives are realized by fewer workers, thus dispensing with a part of the actual labor force in the labor market which, of course, is foreign.

Figures and statistics indicate the following:

The total number of civilian employees in the kingdom will drop from about 4.45 million at the end of the 3rd plan to about 4.22 million at the end of the 4th plan, a net drop of about 225,500 during the plan years or an annual rate of 1 percent.

The 225,500 drop in the labor force notwithstanding, the Saudi labor force will grow by about 375,000 workers through the replacement of foreign labor. Consequently, the ratio of Saudis to the total labor force will rise to 51.2 percent at the end of the 4th plan, from 40.2 percent at the end of the 3rd plan.

Close to 600,000 foreign workers will be dismissed during the 4th plan at an annual rate of 5 percent. It is noted here that the rate of increase in employing Saudi workers is lower than that of dismissing foreign labor.

Statistics indicate the following:

Actual job opportunities available to the Saudis will drop by 106,000 jobs as compared to a Saudi labor force of 494,000 workers of various educational levels ready to enter the job market. This discrepancy will be eliminated by dismissing close to 600,000 foreign workers.

The number of university graduates during the 4th plan is expected to reach 55,000 vying for 4,300 new job opportunities. This discrepancy will be eliminated by dismissing about 50,500 contract employees filling managerial, vocational and technical positions.

New job opportunities for unskilled labor will be significantly tighter inasmuch as such opportunities will decrease by 143,000 jobs while 172,000 Saudi workers will enter the labor market, thus requiring the dismissal of about 315,000 foreign workers in that category.

A Riyadh Chamber of Commerce study mentions several recommendations, some of which are listed below:

— Tying the educational policy to the development process in an attempt to reconcile the number and specializations of graduates and the actual development needs, taking into consideration the recently-noted increase in theoretical specializations, the humanities in particular, beyond the market's needs while the country is in need of more scientific, technical and educational specializations.

— Facilitating the transfer of experienced government employees to the private sector to give new graduates a chance to work in government because the private sector tends to rely on almost ready-made labor from the standpoint of experience.

— Coordinating with the private sector to come up with a clear and fixed wage, grade and promotion system similar to the one used for civil service employees

whereby graduates can guarantee their promotion to higher levels and are able to transfer from government to private jobs without losing any of their employment rights.

— Allowing students who study abroad at government expense to work in the private sector upon their return in view of the fact that their employment by this sector gives others a chance to study abroad and join the national service, be it in the government or the private sector.

— Recommending to government agencies, government-owned corporations in particular, the establishment of a summer job program for university students to prepare them for government or private sector employment in similar fields upon their graduation.

With regard to the private sector:

Businessmen must adopt various ways and means to lure employees to private sector jobs by instituting special incentives and inducements that are bound to attract the national labor force to replace foreign labor.

Saudization process and the absorption of Saudi graduates should be considered in essence a national issue far removed from the criteria of profit and loss and the cost of such labor.

Foreign labor should be curbed and a serious search should be conducted in the local market for domestic labor necessary to keep business going.

Serious efforts should be made to establish large ventures such as joint-stock companies that employ large number of national capabilities.

The job training process should be intensified to allow the absorption of new graduates into the labor force to replace foreign labor.

Chamber of Commerce training programs should be expanded to open technical and applied training possibilities to university graduates. Universities, chambers of commerce and businessmen can get together to coordinate specific training programs for university graduates and to assign them to jobs commensurate with their training.

University students should get trained at private sector installations prior to graduation during their summer vacation, each in his field of specialization, to allow them to fill these positions upon graduation after having gained experience in their respective fields.

## SUDAN

### Negotiations with Southern Parties Reported

45040013b London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic

12 Oct 87 p 20

[Text] A delegation of the southern parties, which had travelled to Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya to negotiate with the SPLA (which is under the leadership of Col John Garang) recently returned to the Sudanese capital. Discussions between the two delegations in the three African capitals led to an agreement concerning the civil war taking place in the Southern Sudan. The new agreement elicited widespread reactions from Sudanese government and political sources following the signing of the agreement by five southern parties which participate in the government of Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. Al-Mahdi initially hastened to reject the attempt by the southern parties to conclude a separate agreement with the movement of Col John Garang, because Garang is waging a war against the Sudanese Armed Forces in the south of the country.

Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi stated that those negotiating with Garang do not represent their parties, and that the attempt to conclude an agreement is considered an individual initiative. The Sudanese Foreign Office also expressed its concern regarding the geographical scope of the negotiations—from the Ethiopian capital to the capitals of Kenya and Uganda. The Sudanese government requested an explanation from the governments of the two countries regarding the significance of permitting the delegation of the southern parties and Col Garang to hold negotiations in their territories without the knowledge of the government in the Sudan. It was observed that both Kenya and Uganda participated officially in the agreement between the two parties because Kenya's president, Daniel Arap Moi, witnessed the final signing ceremony. Following this, Kenya and Uganda informed the Sudan that the negotiations and agreement occurred within the framework of the mediation provided by the two countries to end the struggle in Southern Sudan, and that the negotiations and agreement did not deviate from the previous agreement of the government of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi that the two countries continue their efforts to achieve peace.

At the beginning of this month, the Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, sent a representative to al-Sadiq al-Mahdi with a communique containing the details of the meetings held between the southern parties and Garang's movement. Following the return of the delegation of the southern parties to Khartoum, the Prime Minister—in a joint meeting—studied the details of the negotiations held in the three African capitals. The Prime Minister expressed satisfaction with some of the results of the negotiations, but displayed reservations regarding other results of the negotiations. Those attending the meeting agreed to present those results to all Sudanese political powers in order for them to make known their opinions and reach a unified opinion regarding the convocation of

the anticipated constitutional convention, at which discussions will be held regarding the war in the south and other issues pertaining to the Sudanese government.

The agreement reached by the southern parties and the Popular Movement is considered an affirmation of the previous agreement reached by the National Assembly, which includes most of the Sudanese parties and the Popular Movement, last February at Koka Dam in Ethiopia. This last agreement laid down the appropriate conditions for the participation of the Popular Movement in any peace negotiations with the government in Khartoum. At the same time, the ground was prepared for convening the anticipated constitutional conference. Among the outstanding points of the agreement is the abrogation of the September 1943 laws enacted by the Numayri regime, and the abrogation of the military agreements with Egypt and Libya. The agreement also includes several other details pertaining to the country's constitution.

Following the southern parties' delegation's return from its tour of East Africa, the southern parties affirmed their approval of the agreement they reached with Garang's movement. The National Sudanese Party and the Ana Nya II military wing—which split with the political wing—also supported the agreement. The southern parties have begun making extensive efforts in Khartoum to continue their consultations with the northern Sudanese parties by explaining details of the agreement. In Khartoum, the head of the southern parties group and the chairman of the People's Progressive Party, Eliaba James Surur, told AL-DUSTUR that the agreement reached with Garang's movement is considered a real opening to peace in southern Sudan and the stabilization of the government. He stated that they found Col John Garang and his supporters prepared to achieve this goal in light of the contents of the agreement concluded between the two parties. Surur added that the effort undertaken by the southern parties group was initiated and aided by the Federation of Sudanese Churches, which is acting as a mediator between the Sudanese government and Garang's movement. This effort began last year, authorized by the head of the country and the Sudanese cabinet.

13286

**New Railroad Grant From World Bank**  
45040013c London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic  
19 Oct 87 p 38

[Text] A delegation from the World Bank visited Sudan this month to put the finishing touches on an agreement, according to which the bank will provide a grant of \$70 million to the Sudanese Railroad Organization. The program stipulated by the agreement includes the development of the organization's operating methods, the provision of technical and administrative assistance to the organization, and work toward increasing its load capacity.

Western sources in Washington remarked that the agreement between Sudan and the World Bank became possible after Sudan accepted the bank's conditions that the general director of the Railroad Organization be dismissed, and that a new director be appointed to take his place.

Following the bank's consent to the agreement, the Sudan obtained the agreement of West Germany and the British Overseas Development Organization, which sent a team to Khartoum to assist the organization's administration in preparing for the World Bank delegation.

It is expected that the Sudanese Railroad Organization will issue an invitation for bids for the import of spare parts and technical assistance this November. Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi expects that his government will obtain the agreement of a number of other international parties to contribute to the reconstruction of the Railroad Organization.

13286

**YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC**

**President Discusses Oil, Unity, International Relations**

44040019 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic  
31 Oct 87 p 14

[Interview with President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, by Antoine 'Abd-al-Masih: "President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih to AL-MUSTAQBAL, 'Oil To Unify Yemen'"; Sanaa, date not given]

[Text] Yemen is rending its mythical halo and advancing confidently toward the thresholds of the 20th century. That is the general impression that a person gets when he arrives in Sanaa. Modernization extends to most of the production sectors and is accompanied by internal stability and a balanced opening to the outside world.

Modernization, stability, and openness are the keynotes of Yemeni policy under the administration of President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, who granted AL-MUSTAQBAL the following interview.

[Question] The discovery of oil in Yemen is an important historical event: many consider it the most important event after the 26 September Revolution. One notices, however, that Yemeni government agencies are offering only very general information about the subject. What is the reason for that?

[Answer] Nothing is more important than the glorious 26 September Revolution, for by virtue of it our people have been able to set out toward modern times and realize many gains and successes in all areas, including the discovery of oil. The information that government agencies are offering is official information that can be relied upon.

[Question] What are the budget figures for the Third 5-Year Plan? Does this plan rely on expected oil revenues?

[Answer] The Third 5-Year Plan will shortly be published with its details and figures, after it has been approved. Like other previous development plans, it is being drawn up within the limits of available resources. The expected oil revenues will in fact be invested within the framework of this plan.

[Question] If Yemen becomes an oil country in every sense of the word, God willing, do you believe that will hasten unification, or will it increase its difficulties?

[Answer] Any good thing discovered anywhere on Yemeni soil is to the benefit of the homeland as a whole and therefore serves the goals of the Yemeni revolution, foremost among them being the goal of reestablishing Yemeni unity.

[Question] In your political communique on the eve of the silver anniversary celebration, you announced that the government of Yemen would continue to grant maximum patronage, financial facilities, and guarantees to private investments, and you welcomed anyone desiring to invest his funds in Yemen. What is currently the size of Arab and foreign investments in Yemen?

[Answer] Private Arab and international investments in our country are still within the narrowest bounds, but we hope they will widen in coming stages as a result of the guarantees and facilities our country is offering and because of the existence of broad areas available for such investments.

[Question] It appears that unity between the two halves of Yemen is still only a matter of wishes and dreams. In your opinion, what are the difficulties impeding it? Do you not believe that the more protracted the time, the more difficult unity becomes?

[Answer] The steps that have been realized on the road to restoring Yemeni unity have gone beyond the stage of wishes and dreams. The joint committees on unity have accomplished their work, at the forefront of which is the draft constitution of a single state. All that remains is that it be presented to the people's assemblies in the two halves and be submitted to the people in the two halves for approval, so that a unity government can then be proclaimed.

Relations between the two halves of the homeland are relations of normal brotherhood. Meetings and discussions are continuing concerning the various issues of interest to the two halves, especially the issue of reunification.

[Question] It is well known that the former president of South Yemen, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, lives in Sanaa. In what capacity is he residing? Do you approve of his political moves and activities? Are you giving him any assistance: material, moral, or political?

[Answer] The emigrants from our southern half are living in their homeland and among their people. There are no moves or activities that might disturb relations between the two halves in any way.

[Question] The southern half of Yemen has highly favored relations with the Soviet Union. Does it worry you that Aden is turning into a Soviet base, especially since the Soviet Union is currently unable to replace Aden with another base in the region?

[Answer] Yemeni-Soviet relations are historically excellent relations. The Soviet Union was in the vanguard of countries who offered our country aid and support under the darkest of circumstances.

Relations of friendship and cooperation continue to grow and develop between our Yemeni people and the peoples of the Soviet Union.

[Question] Yemen has a balanced foreign policy vis-a-vis the Arabs and internationally. Are you resolved on taking any particular initiative regarding some of the Arab-Arab crises, especially during the emergency Arab summit?

[Answer] Our country's balanced Arab and international policy comes as a practical translation of the goals of the glorious 26 September Revolution and of the contents of the National Charter. Within the framework of mutual respect and noninterference in internal affairs, we have been able to develop our country's relations and extend bridges of cooperation with various states. This policy has borne fruit in realizing an effective Yemeni presence in all efforts aimed at clearing the Arab air and restoring Arab solidarity to its former state, so that the Arab nation can stand firm in the face of various challenges and dangers. Together with all brother [Arabs], we have never and shall never spare any effort at sincere endeavor to emerge from the state of decline the Arab homeland is experiencing at the present time.

[Question] As is well known, there has been a revolution raging in Eritrea for decades, supported by many Arab countries, since most, if not all Arabs consider Eritrea part of the Arab homeland. After having received Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile-Mariam in Yemen, what will you say to the Eritrean revolutionaries if they ask the Arabs for solidarity with them?

[Answer] Our country's relations with the Democratic Republic of Ethiopia are historic and constantly growing because of the benefit to the two countries. Ethiopia has and still plays host to a large number of overseas Yemenis. We hope the growth of relations between our

country and Ethiopia and the exchange of visits between us and His Excellency President Mengistu Haile-Mariam will be a contributory factor enabling us to share in the various efforts to bring about a solution to the problem of Eritrea in the context of noninterference in Ethiopia's internal affairs.[Question] In recent days, the Gulf war has taken on international dimensions, and the Arabian Gulf and Arabian Sea are crowded with foreign fleets. Are you worried about repercussions on your country?

[Answer] The Gulf war and its consequences have had great effects on the security and stability of the entire region. However, recent international stands, especially Security Council Resolution 598, can limit these effects. We hope international efforts will lead to the final

cadres—not to mention the fact that PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat is almost a continuous resident in Yemen. Does this intensive presence impose particular responsibilities upon you?

[Answer] The Palestine issue is our destiny-related issue and the issue of all [Arab] brothers. The Palestinian presence in our country was necessitated by the critical circumstances through which the Palestinian revolution passed. The presence of the freedom fighter, Brother Yasir 'Arafat, in Sanaa from time to time is nothing strange. He is in his homeland and among his people and brothers. That imposes no other responsibilities on us, apart from our responsibilities toward the Palestinian issue.

10

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